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This dissertation focuses on the relationship between a firm’s operational deci-
sions and its bankruptcy risk. It consists of three self-contained chapters. All
three chapters are joint work with Professor Vishal Gaur.
Chapter 1 studies the implications of asset based lending for operational in-
vestment, probability of bankruptcy, and capital structure for a borrower firm.
We set up a single-period game with two players, a business owner and a bank.
The business owner decides how to allocate her capital between the equity of a
new business and the external capital market in order to maximize her expected
profit. We model the new business as a single-period inventory (newsvendor)
model. The bank does not know the newsvendor’s demand distribution, and
sets an asset based credit limit to maximize its expected profits. We show that
the equilibrium order quantity is a function of market parameters, and deviates
from the classical newsvendor solution. In this solution, asset based lending
leads to an upper limit on the potential loss faced by the bank, and thus, helps
manage bankruptcy risk. In particular, the collateral value of inventory is a
function of the bank’s belief regarding the firm’s demand distribution because
the amount of inventory that will have to be liquidated in case of a default is ran-
dom and depends on the realized demand. We also show that the probability of
bankruptcy and the capital structure at equilibrium are functions of information
asymmetry, bankruptcy costs, and the newsvendor model parameters.
Chapter 2 focuses on a cash constrained firm that has to balance growth
and bankruptcy risk when making its operational and borrowing decisions. We
study the operational implications of this tradeoff by setting up a finite hori-
zon cash-constrained inventory model with non-stationary demand, which is
a function of the firm’s past sales. We analyze four different growth scenar-
ios: unconstrained growth, self-financing growth, growth under reorganization
bankruptcy, and growth under liquidation bankruptcy. These scenarios capture
different aspects of the impact of financing constraints and the bankruptcy pro-
cess on a firm’s operational decisions. Our analysis shows that a self-financing
growth strategy, which avoids risky borrowing, is overly conservative and that
growth requires making risky operational investment decisions. That is, a cash
constrained firm should take some risk and over-invest (i.e., ordermore than the
classical single period newsvendor quantity) to fuel growth. However, the firm
should be cautious because over-investment amplifies bankruptcy risk. Hence,
we show that the firm needs to achieve the right balance between growth and
bankruptcy risk to maximize its long term profits.
Chapter 3 investigates whether inventory productivity explains financial
distress for retailers. Inventory is a key management item, which usually is
the largest current asset in a retailer’s books. Since a vast majority of a re-
tailer’s operational decisions are related to inventory, we hypothesize that re-
tailers with high inventory productivity have lower probability of bankruptcy.
Using a data set of retail bankruptcies, we test this hypothesis by adding inven-
tory turnover as an explanatory variable to three commonly used bankruptcy
predictionmodels. Our analysis shows that inventory turnover significantly im-
proves the model fit in all three models and that retailers with high inventory
turnover have lower probability of bankruptcy. These results have important
implications for bankruptcy prediction and turnaround management.
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CHAPTER 1
OPERATIONAL INVESTMENT AND CAPITAL STRUCTURE UNDER
ASSET BASED LENDING: A ONE PERIODMODEL
1.1 Introduction
Asset Based Lending (ABL) is a method commonly used by banks to lend
money to small and risky businesses. In this method, a bank sets a maximum
lending amount secured by the current assets of the borrowing firm, which in-
clude its inventory, cash, and account receivables. Inventory is an important
basis for ABL; asset based loans secured solely by inventory are common in
practice, especially in the retail industry (GE Capital [36], page 14), which is one
of the top three asset based borrowers (Commercial Finance Association [25]).
Banks use simple rules of thumb to assess the collateral value of inventory, such
as its type (i.e., raw material, work in process, finished goods) and its age (GE
Capital [36]). However, such rules of thumb do not optimize the credit limit or
the collateral value of inventory when the demand faced by the firm is uncer-
tain.
ABL is a large industry. In 2009, the total amount of outstanding asset
based loans in the USA was $480 billion (Commercial Finance Association [25]),
which constituted 25% of the total amount of loans and short term papers is-
sued to nonfinancial corporations (the Federal Reserve [12]). ABL is useful to
banks because they are usually not well-informed regarding the future demand
prospects of the borrower. ABL mitigates the cost of this information asym-
metry by preventing over-borrowing. Furthermore, since an asset based loan
is secured by the borrower’s current assets, the bank can recover some of its
1
losses by liquidating the borrower’s assets in case of a default. ABL is also use-
ful to small businesses by providing them access to low interest rate financing.
Such businesses typically do not have access to cash flow financing, which is
availed by large companies with revenues in excess of $25 million and stable
profits (Burroughs [14]). Examples of such low interest rate financing include
programs offered by the Small Business Association (SBA), such as the Standard
Asset Based CAPLines program (Godfrey [37]) and the Small Business Lending
Fund established for community banks as a part of the Small Business Jobs Act
(The Secured Lender Industry News [80]). These programs allow participating
banks to provide asset based loans to small businesses, wherein the SBA sets a
maximum allowable interest rate. For example, this interest rate was equal to
the prime rate plus 2.25% as of November 2011 (SBA [74]).
This chapter studies the implications of ABL for the operational investment,
capital structure, and probability of bankruptcy of a borrower firm. We set up
a single-period game theoretic model with two players, a business owner and
a bank. The business owner decides how to allocate her capital between the
equity of a new business and the external capital market in order to maximize
her expected profit. The business is represented using the newsvendor model.
The owner sets up the business as a limited liability firm, interacts with the bank
on its behalf, and manages its operations. The bank provides a loan to the firm
at a fixed interest rate. It sets a credit limit, secured by inventory, to maximize
its expected profit when it is partially informed about the demand distribution
of the newsvendor firm.
We address three research questions. First, what should be the equity in-
vestment and order quantity decisions of the owner at equilibrium? Second,
2
how should the bank determine the collateral value of inventory and the asset
based credit limit to maximize its expected profit under information asymme-
try? Third, what is the probability of bankruptcy of the firm at equilibrium?
Through these questions, we show that firm characteristics, captured by the
newsvendor model parameters, and the economic environment, captured by
the return on the external investment alternative, the lending interest rate, and
the lender’s sentiment (i.e., the bank’s belief regarding the newsvendor’s de-
mand distribution), affect the owner’s operational and financial decisions, the
credit limit offered by the bank, and the probability of bankruptcy.
One result of our study is that the owner’s choice of debt and equity
shapes the firm’s order quantity through the overage and underage costs of the
newsvendor model. This choice is driven by the tradeoff between investing in
the external market and investing in the newsvendor. For example, if the ex-
ternal capital market offers a higher return, then the owner chooses to invest a
smaller amount in the equity of the firm and rely more on debt to finance the
inventory. However, the bank prevents the firm from over-borrowing by impos-
ing an asset based credit limit. As a result, the equilibrium outcome can be of
three types: when the firm borrows and has non-zero probability of bankruptcy,
when the firm borrows with zero probability of bankruptcy, and when the firm
does not borrow.
A second result of our study is the structure of the optimal asset based
credit and the collateral value of inventory. The credit limit decomposes into
two components: a riskless component which can be recovered even if the real-
ized demand is zero, and a risky component which is tied to the firm’s demand
prospects and information asymmetry. Thus, the bank’s belief regarding the
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firm’s demand distribution plays an important role. For example, when the
bank is pessimistic about the demand prospects of the firm, it lowers the collat-
eral value of inventory to tighten the credit limit. However, a tight credit limit
might lead to a counter-intuitive equilibrium outcome in which the owner in-
creases the order quantity by injecting more equity in the firm. Moreover, the
collateral value of inventory becomes a function of the bank’s belief regarding
the firm’s demand distribution and other parameters. This result contrasts with
the common practice of banks to use simple rules of thumb to value inventory
and set a credit limit.
The third main result of our study is related to the equilibrium probability of
bankruptcy. Interestingly, we find that when the firm borrows with bankruptcy
risk, the credit limit is always binding. In other words, a solution in which the
firm may borrow with bankruptcy risk and not use up the entire credit limit
never arises at equilibrium. Furthermore, we find that the bank sets the optimal
credit limit in such a way that the probability of bankruptcy becomes indepen-
dent of the owner’s choice of debt and equity as long as the firm borrows with
risk. We also show that the probability of bankruptcy depends on the newsven-
dor parameters. For example, it increases in the salvage value of the inventory
because the credit limit and the equilibrium order quantity both increase in the
salvage value.
1.2 Literature Review
Despite its practical usage, ABL has not been well studied in the academic lit-
erature. The majority of the analytical models of capital structure in corporate
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finance focus on bondholders, and do not include the setting of a credit limit.
Further, most of these models do not capture the details of the operational de-
cisions. In the operations literature, ABL has been analyzed by Buzacott and
Zhang [15]. While their paper provides many insights, it treats the equity of
the firm as given, and so does not model the implication of ABL for capital
structure. Moreover, there is no information asymmetry. Therefore, our work
contributes to the operations-finance interface literature bymodeling the equity,
borrowing, and operational investment decisions of the business owner in the
presence of an asset based credit limit, information asymmetry, taxation, and
costly bankruptcy. The literature in these areas being vast, we describe relevant
papers in brief.
Modigliani and Miller [61] show that, in a perfect market, the capital struc-
ture of a firm is irrelevant to its optimal operational decisions. That is, the de-
cision that maximizes the value to shareholders is equal to the decision that
maximizes the total value of the firm. Subsequent research has led to two com-
peting theories of capital structure, the tradeoff theory and the pecking order
theory. Research on the tradeoff theory shows the existence of an optimal capi-
tal structure due to market frictions such as interest rate spread, taxation, costly
bankruptcy, and liquidity constraints (e.g., Modigliani and Miller [62], Kraus
and Litzenberge [48], Gordon [38]), but under complete information. A few papers
in this stream consider firms’ operational decision models in detail. In particu-
lar, Stiglitz [76] shows a connection between operational and financial decisions
under bankruptcy risk, and Dotan and Ravid [28] model the optimal capacity,
financing, and production decisions with uncertain sales price. In contrast to
the tradeoff theory, the pecking order theory shows the existence of a financing
hierarchy that minimizes the costs related to incomplete information (Jensen and
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Meckling [45], Myers [66], Myers and Majluf [65], and Childs et al. [22]). Ac-
cording to Frank and Goyal [35], the pecking order theory models are relatively
simple with linear objective functions, and thus, illustrate financing hierarchy
under strong modeling assumptions, rather than giving a unifying framework.
The recent literature in capital structure is largely empirical. Interestingly, it
obtains some findings that relate to operational characteristics of firms but can-
not be explained by the theoretical models. For example, Lemmon et al. [55]
show that there is substantial unexplained variation in capital structure, which
is firm-specific and time-invariant; Rauh and Sufi [72] illustrate that what a firm
produces and the production assets it uses are the most important determinants
of capital structure in the cross section; and Campello and Giambona [18] show
that firms with redeployable assets have more debt capacity. Other empirical
papers have investigated the relationship of capital structure with various firm
characteristics, including profitability, growth, liquidation value, return volatil-
ity, and operational risks. See Harris and Raviv [40] and Leary and Graham [51]
for extensive reviews of the empirical capital structure literature.
Our study builds on the capital structure literature by studying ABL un-
der information asymmetry, incorporating the newsvendor model framework,
and allowing an external investment option to the owner. This combination
of a practical borrowing model and a realistic investment scenario reveals new
insights regarding the interaction of the owner’s operational and financial deci-
sions. For example, our model yields predictions that are consistent with empir-
ical observations in corporate finance with respect to the impact of operational
characteristics, such as profitability, demand volatility, and asset recoverability
(salvage value in our model), on a firm’s capital structure. Additionally, con-
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trary to the majority of the asymmetric information models that lead to under-
investment (Hubbard [44]), our study shows a non-monotone relationship be-
tween information asymmetry and operational investment.
The operations management literature on joint operational-financial deci-
sions addresses market imperfections by including taxes, liquidity constraints,
bankruptcy risk, costly issuance of debt and equity, and credit limits into single-
and multi-period inventory models. Among single-period models, Xu and
Birge [82] investigate the tradeoff between bankruptcy costs and the tax benefits
of debt in a cash-constrained newsvendor model. Their analysis shows that in-
tegrating operational and financial decisions can improve firm value. Buzacott
and Zhang [15] study single- and multi-period models with asset based credit
limit. The second half of their paper is relevant to our work. It analyzes a single-
period model in which a newsvendor and a bank seek to maximize own profits
in the presence of bankruptcy risk. Dada and Hu [26] use a similar framework,
with the difference that the bank chooses an optimal interest rate to charge to the
newsvendor, instead of imposing a borrowing limit. They show the existence
and uniqueness of an equilibrium order quantity-interest rate pair. Multi-period
inventory models analyze similar operational issues with additional financial
dynamics, such as cash flows, dividend payments and capital subscriptions,
e.g., Li et al. [56], Hu and Sobel [42], Chao et al. [20], and Hu et al. [43].
Research on the impact of financial considerations on operational deci-
sions is not limited to inventory models. Financial constraints and the risk of
bankruptcy also affect the firm’s survival strategy (Archibald et al. [6]), rela-
tions with its supply chain partners (Lai et al. [50], Babich [8], Kouvelis and
Zhao [47], and Yang and Birge [84]), the choice of production technologies (Led-
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erer and Singhal [53], and Boyabatli and Toktay [13]), the optimal time to shut
down a firm (Xu and Birge [83]), and the optimal time to offer an IPO (Babich
and Sobel [9]).
We contribute to the single-period operations management models by endo-
genizing the owner’s equity decision. In our model, the owner faces a trade-
off between investing in the newsvendor and investing in the external capital
market, which shapes the equity investment decision and puts the firm’s oper-
ational decisions in a broader context. Furthermore, we introduce the bank as
a second player in the model in order to incorporate information asymmetry.
Thus, the owner is not the only decision maker. This setting captures the impact
of market conditions (e.g., the external market return, the bank’s lending sen-
timent) on the equilibrium order quantity, the capital structure, and the risk of
bankruptcy.
1.3 Model
We set up a single-period model with two players, a small business owner and
a commercial bank. The owner has capital K to invest and wishes to allocate
this capital between a new business and the external capital market. The new
business is a single-period inventory (newsvendor) model. The owner makes
three related decisions: how much equity and debt to have in the newsvendor
business and what stocking quantity to purchase. The first two constitute the
capital structure of the firm, and the third its operational investment. Let x 2
[0;K] denote the amount of equity of the newsvendor, w its borrowing amount,
and q its stocking quantity.
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The owner constitutes the newsvendor business as a limited liability firm.
This means that the owner and the firm are separate legal personalities, as per
corporate law, and the owner’s loss is limited to the amount of equity in case
the firm defaults on the loan. However, since the owner makes the stocking and
borrowing decisions for the firm, their objectives are aligned. We use the terms
newsvendor and firm interchangeably.
The bank is a monopoly that seeks to maximize its expected profit by lend-
ing to the firm. We assume that the bank does not know the true demand dis-
tribution of the firm. It charges a fixed interest rate , and sets an asset-based
credit limit to prevent over-borrowing. Assuming a fixed interest rate, instead
of allowing the bank to optimize the interest rate or set it to achieve a risk-free
rate of return under its belief of the demand distribution, helps simplify our
model and focus on the implications of asset based lending. This assumption is
also practically relevant for small businesses that obtain asset based loans un-
der programs governed by the SBA. As we discussed in Section 1.1, the SBA
sets a maximum interest rate and many small businesses borrow at that rate.1
Finally, increasing the interest rate can lower the bank’s profit by changing the
set of borrowing firms and inducing firms to make riskier investments (Stiglitz
and Weiss [77]). The literature on this well known adverse selection problem
implies that the lending interest rate should be optimized for a population of
borrowers, not for an individual firm; see Greenwald and Stiglitz [39] (page 15).
1Bates [10] (page 230) discusses examples of small firms that borrow at the maximum interest
rate set by the SBA, e.g., “Exim Capital [an asset based lender], [is] typically charging its bor-
rowers interest rates in the 15% annual range... Chun [a manager at Exim Capital] would like
to charge 18%, but SBA regulations hold him currently to 15%...[T]he collateral [is] involved
in six typical loans made by Exim Capital, which involved secured loans to (a) Jee and Jung
Cleaners, (b) C.H.A. Kyung, Inc., (c) Tri J. Tires, (d) H.S.K. Cleaners, (e) 104 Broadway Farm
(a grocery), and (f) Chonel, Inc. Loan sizes ranged from $52,000 to $105,000 in these six trans-
actions...[T]he six deals offered collateral to Exim Capital ranging from $162,500 to $801,000.”
Lending interest rates are also closely monitored and capped in developing countries with a
history of loan-sharking (Park [69]).
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It also implies that a credit allocation mechanism, such as asset based lending,
mitigates adverse selection by preventing over-borrowing. In Section 1.6, we
discuss these issues in detail, present alternative models with interest rate opti-
mization, and illustrate that using ABL leads to a higher expected profit for the
bank than optimizing the interest rate without a credit limit.
Our remaining assumptions are as follows. Similar to the capital struc-
ture literature, which deals with a tradeoff between the tax shield of debt and
bankruptcy costs, we assume that the firm pays taxes on its income at a corpo-
rate tax rate , and the after-tax income accrues to the owner. We also assume
that the bank incurs a bankruptcy cost proportional to its loss if the firm de-
faults. We do not apply corporate taxes to the bank’s income or personal taxes
to the owner because there are no economic tradeoffs related to these taxes in
our model. Taxes will merely scale the respective incomes without changing the
nature of results. Therefore, we ignore them for simplicity, and assume that the
bank and the owner live for more than one period and have other sources of
income that they can offset losses against.
The sequence of events is as follows. First, the owner determines the amount
of equity of her firm, x 2 [0;K]. Then, she manages the firm. She interacts with
the bank on behalf of the firm and borrows w without exceeding a credit limit
 set by the bank. This gives her a total capital of x + w to run the newsvendor
business. She orders q units by paying cq to her supplier, where c denotes the
per unit cost. The amount cq cannot exceed x + w because the payment to the
supplier is due when the order is placed. A random demand  occurs. If 
is small enough so that the firm cannot repay the loan with interest, then the
firm declares bankruptcy and its cash and inventory are possessed by the bank.
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Otherwise, the firm generates a revenue of pminf; qg+ s(q )+, where p denotes
the selling price, s denotes the salvage value of unsold units, and (q   )+ 
maxfq  ; 0g. The pre-tax operating income of the firm is thus equal to pminf; qg+
s(q   )+   cq   w. The firm pays corporate tax at rate  if the operating income
is positive, and zero tax if it incurs an operating loss. It repays the loan plus
interest, (1 + )w, to the bank and its after-tax ending cash position accrues to the
owner.
Since we investigate asset based lending, the inventory of the firmmust have
a positive salvage value so that it can be used as collateral. Hence, we have
s > 0. A good illustration of the usefulness of salvaging inventory in ABL is
provided by the bankruptcy filing and the subsequent inventory liquidation of
the Borders Group, Inc. Borders obtained an asset based loan of $700 million in
April 2010 from a consortium of lenders (ABF Journal [7]). After its Chapter 11
bankruptcy protection in February 2011 and Chapter 7 liquidation in July 2011,
Gordon Brothers Group and Hilco Merchant Resources sold Borders’ invento-
ries at 40-60 percent discounts (Legal News [54]).
The demand  is non-negative and follows a continuous probability distribu-
tion with increasing failure rate (IFR). The pdf, cdf, complementary cdf (ccdf),
and inverse ccdf of the demand distribution are denoted as f , F, F¯, and F¯ 1, re-
spectively, where f is positive on an interval and zero elsewhere. Also let g;G; G¯
denote the pdf, cdf, and ccdf, respectively, of the bank’s belief of the demand
distribution. The bank uses this belief to assess the newsvendor’s loan applica-
tion. All parameters other than the newsvendor’s true demand distribution are
common knowledge. For the newsvendor problem to be non-trivial, we assume
that (1   )(p   s) > (1 + )c   s and c > s. These assumptions are necessary for
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the tail probability of the demand distribution to lie between 0 and 1. We also
require that p s(1+)c s  1 + , i.e., the profit margin of the newsvendor is suffi-
ciently high so that the rate of return of a sold unit that is purchased on credit,
p s
(1+)c s   1, is no less than the borrowing rate .
Our analysis proceeds in the reverse sequence of time. We first solve for
the newsvendor’s stocking decision and the bank’s credit limit decision given
the equity of the newsvendor. We then solve the newsvendor-bank sub-game
and the owner’s capital allocation problem, which determines her firm’s capital
structure and order quantity at equilibrium.
1.3.1 The Newsvendor’s Problem
The newsvendor’s ending cash position after payment of loan with interest and
taxes is
(q;w; x; ) =

x + w   cq + pminf; qg + s(q   )+   (1 + )w
   pminf; qg + s(q   )+   cq   w+ +:
Thus, the owner solves the following problem for the newsvendor as a function
of the equity x in order to determine her payoff:
(x) = max
(q;w)2C(x; )
EF

(q;w; x; )

: (1.1)
Here, EF denotes expectation with respect to the distribution of demand, and
C(x;  ) = f(q;w) 2 R2+ : w   ; cq  x+wg is the constraint set, where R denotes the
real line. The first constraint is that the borrowing amount w must be less than
the credit limit  set by the bank. The second constraint specifies that the cost of
procurement must be less than the total cash available to the newsvendor at the
12
outset. We solve the newsvendor’s problem ignoring the first constraint. Then,
we solve the bank’s problem to compute  . Finally, we determine conditions in
which the credit limit is binding.
It is important to note that the newsvendor will not simultaneously borrow
and hold excess cash, i.e.,
w = (cq   x)+: (1.2)
Intuitively, this condition occurs because  > 0. We omit the proof, which fol-
lows by a contradiction argument. This condition implies that there are three
possible scenarios that can occur based on the values of the starting capital
and the order quantity of the newsvendor. We denote as (NB) the scenario in
which the newsvendor has enough cash to purchase inventory and does not
borrow any money from the bank. In scenario (BWO), the newsvendor’s bor-
rowing amount is sufficiently small as to be without bankruptcy risk. In sce-
nario (BWR), the newsvendor borrows with bankruptcy risk. We use the su-
perscripts NB, BWO and BWR to denote variables in the respective solutions.
Figure 1.1 depicts the regions defining these three scenarios as functions of the
order quantity q, the demand realization , and the equity x.
We now characterize the newsvendor’s expected ending cash position un-
der each scenario. Scenario (NB) occurs when q  x=c. In this scenario, the
newsvendor has operating income and pays tax if   c sp sq. It has operating loss
if  < c sp sq. Thus, its ending cash position is
NB(q; 0; x; ) = x + pminf; qg + s(q   )+   cq   (p   s)
h
minf; qg   c sp sq
i+
:
By taking an expectation, we obtain the newsvendor’s expected ending cash
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Figure 1.1: Three cases that can arise as a function of x, q, and . (NB): The
newsvendor does not borrow if q  x=c. It has operating income if  > c sp sq.
Otherwise, it has operating loss. (BWO): The newsvendor borrows without risk
if x=c < q  x. It has operating income if  > dT = [(1+)c s]q xp s . Otherwise, it has
operating loss. (BWR): The newsvendor borrows with risk if x < q  x + .
It has operating income if  > dT . It has operating loss if  < dT . It declares
bankruptcy if  < dB =
[(1+)c s]q (1+)x
p s . It cannot order more than x+  due to the
asset based credit limit imposed by the bank. The values of  and  are defined
in Proposition 1.3.3.
Order Quantity, q
D
em
an
d,
 ξ
0 x c βx βx + θ
Bankruptcy
Operating
loss
Operating income
Infeasible
[(c−s)/(p−s)] x q
dT
dB
position in (NB) as
EF
h
NB
i
= x + (p   s)
0BBBBB@Z q
0
F¯()d   
Z q
c s
p sq
F¯()d
1CCCCCA   (c   s)q: (1.3)
Scenario (BWO) occurs when the order quantity is greater than x=c, but is
sufficiently small so that the newsvendor does not default even when realized
demand is zero. For q > x=c, the newsvendor’s ending cash position when it
realizes demand  = 0 is given by:
(1 + )x   [(1 + )c   s]q   (x   [(1 + )c   s]q)+: (1.4)
Observe that (x   [(1 + )c   s]q)+ = 0 for any q > x=c. That is, the newsvendor
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has operating loss, which implies that qmust not exceed 1+(1+)c s x to ensure that
(1.4) is non-negative. Thus, in scenario (BWO), x=c < q  1+(1+)c s x. Further, to
compute the newsvendor’s ending cash position, we note that the newsvendor
has taxable income if   dT (q; x)  (1+)c sp s q  p s x, and loss otherwise. Therefore,
the newsvendor’s ending cash position in (BWO) is
BWO(q;w; x; ) = (1 + )(x   cq) + pminf; qg + s(q   )+
 (p   s) minf; qg   dT (q; x)+ :
Taking an expectation gives
EF
h
BWO
i
= (1+ )x+ (p  s)
 Z q
0
F¯()d   
Z q
dT (q;x)
F¯()d
!
  [(1+ )c  s]q: (1.5)
Scenario (BWR) occurs and the newsvendor borrows with bankruptcy risk if
q > 1+(1+)c s x. For each such value of q, let dB(q; x) denote the demand realization
below which bankruptcy occurs. The ending cash position at  = dB(q; x) is
(q;w; x; dB(q; x)) = (1 + )x + (p   s)dB(q; x)   [(1 + )c   s]q
 (x + (p   s)dB(q; x)   [(1 + )c   s]q)+:
Observe that when the firm is bankrupt, its operating income cannot be positive
and there are zero taxes. Using this and setting (q;w; x; dB(q; x)) equal to zero
gives the bankruptcy threshold dB(q; x) =

(1+)c s
p s q   1+p s x
+
. For dB(q; x)   
dT (q; x), the newsvendor survives, but has an operating loss. The newsvendor
earns an operating income if demand is higher than the threshold dT (q; x). Thus,
we get
BWR(q;w; x; ) =
8>>>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>>>:
0 if   dB;
(p   s) minf; qg   dB(q; x) if dB <   dT ;
(p   s) dT (q; x)   dB(q; x)
+(1   )(p   s) minf; qg   dT (q; x) if  > dT :
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Taking an expectation gives
EF
h
BWR
i
= (p   s)
"Z q
dB(q;x)
F¯()d   
Z q
dT (q;x)
F¯()d
#
: (1.6)
The above analysis defines the cutoff values of inventory and demand for the
three scenarios and specifies the expected ending cash position of the newsven-
dor for each scenario. Note that the cutoff values of demand are dT and dB,
which respectively denote the minimum demand above which the newsven-
dor makes a profit and pays tax, and the minimum demand above which the
newsvendor does not go bankrupt. Both cutoffs are functions of equity and
inventory. We shall drop the arguments of these functions for notational con-
venience. For instance, dB denotes dB(q; x). Let q˜(x) denote the optimal order
quantity for the newsvendor as a function of its starting capital when there is
no credit limit. Solving the newsvendor’s problem in the three scenarios, we
show that q˜(x) has the following form.
Proposition 1.3.1 Let qBWR(x); qBWO(x); qNB be order quantities defined by:
qBWR(x) = F¯ 1
 
(1 + )c   s
(1   )(p   s)
h
F¯ (dB)   F¯ (dT )
i!
; (1.7)
qBWO(x) = F¯ 1
 
(1 + )c   s
(1   )(p   s)
h
1   F¯ (dT )
i!
; (1.8)
qNB = F¯ 1
 
c   s
(1   )(p   s)
"
1   F¯
 
c   s
p   sq
NB
!#!
: (1.9)
The optimal order quantity for the newsvendor without a credit limit, q˜(x), is given by
qBWR(x) if 0  x < x2, qBWO(x) if x2  x < x3, x=c if x3  x  x4, qNB if x > x4,
where x2  x3  x4 are cutoff values of the newsvendor’s equity. These cutoff values are
uniquely defined by x2 = (1+)c s1+ q
BWR(x2), x3 = cqBWO(x3), x4 = cqNB.
Proof: The first derivative of EF
h
NB
i
with respect to q is
(1   )(p   s)F¯(q)   (c   s)
"
1   F¯
 
c   s
p   sq
!#
;
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whereas the second derivative is
 (1   )(p   s) f (q)   (c   s)
2
p   s f
 
c   s
p   sq
!
 0:
Hence, EF
h
NB
i
is concave. Solving the first order condition for this subscenario
gives qNB. Then x4 is equal to cqNB. The first derivative of EF[BWO] with respect
to q is
(1   )(p   s)F¯(q)   [(1 + )c   s]

1   F¯ (dT (q; x))

; (1.10)
whereas the second derivative is
 (1   )(p   s) f (q)    [(1 + )c   s]
2
p   s f (dT (q; x))  0:
Hence, EF
h
BWO
i
is also concave. Solving the first order condition gives qBWO(x).
x3 can be obtained by setting x = cqBWO(x), and solving the first order condition.
(1   )(p   s) > (1 + )c   s guarantees the existence of qBWO(x), qBWR(x), and qNB.
We need to show that x3  x4 to define the case in which the newsvendor
does not borrow, but uses all of her cash for procurement (i.e., q = x=c). Observe
that qBWO(x3) is obtained by solving
(1   )(p   s)F¯(q)   [(1 + )c   s]
 
1   F¯
 
c   s
p   sq
!!
= 0; (1.11)
whereas qNB(x4) is obtained by solving the same equation in which  is replaced
with 0. Implicit differentiation of qwith respect to  in (1.11) gives
dq
d
=  
(p   s)c

1   F¯

c s
p sq

(1   )(p   s)2 f (q) + [(1 + )c   s](c   s) f

c s
p sq
 < 0:
Hence, qBWO(x3) < qNB(x4) because  > 0, which implies that x3 < x4.
The first derivative of EF[BWR] with respect to q is
(1   )(p   s)F¯(q) + [(1 + )c   s]

F¯(dT   F¯(dB)

: (1.12)
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Then the second derivative is
d2EF[BWR]
dq2
=  (1   )(p   s) f (q) + [(1+)c s]2p s ( f (dB)    f (dT )) : (1.13)
qBWR(x) must satisfy the first order condition. Therefore, at q = qBWR(x)
d2EF[BWR]
dq2
= (1   )(p   s)F¯(q)
0BBBBBBB@ (1   )(p   s) f (q) +
[(1+)c s]2
p s ( f (dB)    f (dT ))
(1   )(p   s)F¯(q)
1CCCCCCCA
= (1   )(p   s)F¯(q)
 
 z(q) + (1 + )c   s
p   s
f (dB)    f (dT )
F¯(dB)   F¯(dT )
!
< (1   )(p   s)F¯(q)
 
 z(q) + (1 + )c   s
p   s
 
f (dB)
F¯(dB)   F¯(dT )
!!
< (1   )(p   s)F¯(q)
 
 z(q) + (1 + )c   s
(1   )(p   s)z(dB)
!
< 0;
where z is the hazard rate function. z(q) > (1+)c s(1 )(p s)z(dB) because  is IFR and
(1+)c s
(1 )(p s) < 1. x2 can be obtained by solving the first order condition of the bor-
rowing with risk case after setting q = 1+(1+)c s x.
Lastly, we need to show that x2  x3. (1.8) implies that x2 and x3 solve
(1   )(p   s)F¯
 
1 + 
(1 + )c   s x2
!
+ F¯
 
x2
p   s
!
= (1 + )c   s (1.14)
and
(1   )(p   s)F¯
 x3
c

+ F¯
 
c   s
p   s
 x3
c
!
= (1 + )c   s; (1.15)
respectively. A pairwise comparison of the scalars multiplied by x2 and x3 in
(1.14) and (1.15) indicates that 1+(1+)c s  1c and 1p s  c s(p s)c . Hence, x2  x3 as at
least one of the equations would be violated otherwise. 
Intuitively, the newsvendor borrows with bankruptcy risk if its equity is less
than x2, borrows without bankruptcy risk if its equity lies between x2 and x3,
and does not borrow if its equity is greater than x3. In the last case, x > x4 and
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the optimal order quantity does not vary with x because the cash constraint is
not binding.
In the next proposition, we show that the optimal order quantity is a non-
monotone function of equity.
Proposition 1.3.2 q˜(x) is continuous in x. It decreases in x when x is sufficiently
small, increases in x for x2  x  x4 and is constant for x  x4.
Proof: The continuity of q˜(x) follows by taking limits from the left and the right
at the breakpoints x2; x3 and x4. For example, at x2, the newsvendor switches
from (BWR) to (BWO). Therefore, the bankruptcy threshold dB approaches zero
as x approaches x2 from below. Mathematically, limx"x2 dB

qBWR(x); x

= 0; which
implies that
lim
x"x2
(1 + )c   s
(1   )(p   s) F¯

qBWR(x2)

= lim
x"x2
F¯ (dB)   F¯ (dT )
= 1   F¯ (dT ) :
Therefore, limx"x2 q
BWR(x2) = qBWO(x2). Similar analysis shows the continuity of
q˜(x) at the other cutoff points.
To show that q˜(x) is decreasing in x for small values of x, we apply the Im-
plicit Function Theorem to (1.7). We get
dqBWR(x)
dx
=
[(1 + )c   s] (1 + ) f (dB)    f (dT )
((1 + )c   s)2( f (dB)    f (dT ))   (1   )(p   s)2 f (qBWR) : (1.16)
The denominator in this equation is equal to (p   s) d2EF [BWR(x)]dq2

q=qBWR(x)
, which is
shown to be negative in the proof of Proposition 1.3.1. The numerator is positive
at x = 0 because dT (q; 0) = dB(q; 0). Thus, (1.16) is negative when x = 0. Since the
function is continuously differentiable, it follows that q˜(x) decreases in x when
x is sufficiently small.
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q˜(x) is increasing in x for x 2 [x2; x3] because EF[BWO] is supermodular, i.e.,
@2EF[BWO]
@q@x
= 
(1 + )c   s
(p   s)2 f (dT )  0: (1.17)
For x 2 [x3; x4], we have q˜(x) = x=c, which implies that q˜(x) increases in x 2
[x3; x4]. Lastly, for x  x4, q˜(x) = qNB, which does not vary with x. 
The main inference from this proposition is that the optimal order quantity
is decreasing in equity for small values of x. This property will be useful in solv-
ing for the equilibrium order quantity. Intuitively, it means that the investor’s
tendency to take riskier operational decisions increases when she injects less
equity. This occurs due to the existence of a moral hazard problem under lim-
ited liability. See Easterbrook and Fischel [32] for a general discussion on the
incentives created by limited liability to transfer risk to debt holders.
1.3.2 The Bank’s Problem
The bank’s objective is to maximize its expected profit by lending to the
newsvendor. Let (q;w; x; ) denote the bank’s profit as a function of the in-
ventory level q, the loan amount w = (cq   x)+, the equity of the firm x and the
realized demand . There are two scenarios. If the realized demand exceeds dB,
then the firm survives and repays the loan plus interest to the bank. As a result,
the inventory collateral is not used and the bank’s profit is equal to (cq  x)+. In
contrast, if the realized demand is below dB, then the firm declares bankruptcy
and its cash p and unsold inventory q    are possessed by the bank. The bank
liquidates q    units to recover its losses. We assume that the salvage value
of leftover inventory for the bank is the same as for the firm because both can
access the same market. However, due to forced liquidation, the bank bears an
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additional bankruptcy cost proportional to the size of the bankruptcy. Hence, if
 < dB, then the bank’s profit is
 (q;w; x; ) = p + s(q   )   b(dB   )   w: (1.18)
Here, b  0 is the bankruptcy cost per unit and the size of the bankruptcy is
given by the difference between the bankruptcy threshold demand dB and the
realized demand .
We rewrite (1.18) by using the definition of dB and by noting that w = cq   x
when dB > 0. Thus, we find that the bank’s profit is given by:

 
q; (cq   x)+; x;  = (cq   x)+   (p   s + b) dB   + ;
which is equal to zero if the firm does not borrow, equal to (cq   x) if the firm
borrows and survives, and equal to (1.18) if the firm borrows and defaults. Ob-
serve that the profit decomposes into two terms, the first gives the profit when
there is no bankruptcy, and the second captures the amount of loan write-off
in case the newsvendor defaults on its loan. The bank’s problem is to deter-
mine the credit limit for the newsvendor in order to maximize the expectation
of (1.19) under its beliefG. This problem is equivalent to finding the order quan-
tity that maximizes the bank’s expected profit. The following proposition solves
the bank’s problem.
Proposition 1.3.3 The bank’s expected profit, EG[ (q; (cq   x)+; x; )], is maximized
when q = qL(x)  x + , where  = 1+(1+)c s and  = p s(1+)c sG¯ 1

1   c(1+)c s

p s
p s+b
 
:
The corresponding asset based credit limit offered by the bank is equal to
 (x) =
s
(1 + )c   s x + c: (1.19)
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Proof: Taking a derivative with respect to q and setting it equal to zero gives
qL(x) as one can show that the bank’s expected return under the newsvendor
bankruptcy is concave in q for a given x. Hence, the bank does not want to lend
more that  (x) = cqL(x)   x. 
Proposition 1.3.3 provides several insights into the effectiveness of this
lending mechanism. First, observe that the credit limit has two components,
sx=[(1 + )c   s] and c. The first component is riskless because it is the max-
imum amount that the firm can borrow and repay with interest in full with
probability 1, i.e., even when the realized demand is zero. The second compo-
nent c is risky because, if the firm borrows more than the first component, its
loan repayment depends on the realized demand. Note that only the riskless
component increases with equity, whereas the risky component is a constant.
Thus, the risky component can be interpreted as the minimum credit line of-
fered to an all-debt newsvendor. That is, the bank is willing to lend money to
the newsvendor based on its demand prospects even if its equity is zero. This
inference is consistent with practice, as banks commonly lend money to firms
with zero or negative equity. Note that  decreases in b, which implies that the
bank will offer a smaller credit line when the bankruptcy cost is high.
Second, only the risky component of the credit limit depends on infor-
mation asymmetry. This outcome is intuitive because the bank can observe
the newsvendor’s equity and inventory. Information asymmetry comes into
the play only when the bank evaluates the newsvendor’s demand prospects.
Lenders’ conservative estimates about potential investments during economic
downturns correspond to a lower  value in our model. This is consistent with
the shrinkage of the aggregate loan supply during economic downturns. (See
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Leary [52] and references therein for the relationship between economic down-
turns and loan supply.)
Third, the bank has full control over its maximum loan write-off because it
is independent of the newsvendor’s starting equity x or the true demand distri-
bution F. To see this, note that the bank’s maximum loan write-off occurs when
the newsvendor borrows up to the credit limit and realizes a demand equal to
zero. Thus, it is equal to (p  s+ b)dB(x+ ; x) = (p  s+ b)G¯ 1
h
1   c(1+)c s

p s
p s+b
i
.
This quantity does not change with x or F. Therefore, even as the amount of the
loan may vary with the equity of the firm or its true demand distribution, the
asset based credit limit creates an upper bound on the bank’s loan write-off.
Finally, we find that if the firm uses its entire credit limit then the distribution
of the bank’s loan write-off is also independent of x. This result is shown in the
following lemma.
Lemma 1.3.1 If the firm uses its entire credit limit, then it orders q = x +  and the
probability distribution of the bank’s loan write-off is independent of x. In other words,
let W  (p   s + b)[dB   ]+ denote the bank’s loan write-off in case the firm defaults
on its loan, and let the maximum ofW beWmax  (p   s + b)G¯ 1
h
1   c(1+)c s

p s
p s+b
i
.
Then
Pr(W  ) =
8>>>><>>>>:
F¯

G¯ 1
h
1   c(1+)c s

p s
p s+b
i
  p s+b

if   Wmax;
1 if  >Wmax;
(1.20)
which is independent of x.
Proof: If the firm uses its entire credit line, then dB = (1+)c sp s (x + )   1+p s x =
G¯ 1
h
1   c(1+)c s

p s
p s+b
i
. The bank’s maximum loan write-off occurs when the
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realized demand is zero. Setting  = 0 in W = (p   s + b)[dB   ]+ gives Wmax.
For 0    Wmax,
PrfW  g = Prf(p   s + b)[dB   ]+  g
= Pr
(
(p   s + b)
 
G¯ 1
"
1   c
(1 + )c   s
 
p   s
p   s + b
!#
  
!
 
)
= F¯
 
G¯ 1
"
1   c
(1 + )c   s
 
p   s
p   s + b
!#
  
p   s + b
!
:

Intuitively, this lemma means that if the firm seeks a larger borrowing, the
bank demands the owner to increase her equity investment proportionately so
that the credit limit increases but the write-off distribution remains unchanged.
As a consequence, contrary to unsecured loans, the riskiness of an asset based
loan does not increase in the borrowing amount, which implies that the bank
does not need to increase the interest rate to compensate for risk as the amount
of borrowing increases. We shall show in the next section that, at equilibrium,
the credit limit is always binding when the firm borrows with bankruptcy risk.
Therefore, the result of Lemma 1.3.1 applies. These insights provide theoretical
justification for the practicality of ABL under information asymmetry.
1.3.3 The Newsvendor-Bank Interaction
Following Propositions 1.3.1 and 1.3.3, the order quantity at equilibrium is given
by q˜(x) if the credit limit is not binding, and by qL(x) otherwise. Lemma 1.3.2
proves a necessary and sufficient condition for these two functions to intersect,
and show when the credit limit is and is not binding.
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Lemma 1.3.2 If qBWR(0)  qL(0) then the credit limit is never binding. If qBWR(0) >
qL(0), then there exists an equity value x1 such that 0 < x1 < x2 and qBWR(x1) = qL(x1)
and the credit limit is binding for x 2 [0; x1]. The value of x1 is given by
(1   )(p   s)
(1 + )c   s F¯(x1 + ) + F¯
 
x1 + [(1 + )c   s]
p   s
!
= F¯
 
(1 + )c   s
p   s 
!
: (1.21)
Proof: qBWR(x) and qL(x) are both continuous functions. First, we show that
qBWR(x2) < qL(x2). To see this, note that x2 = qBWR(x2)=, whereas qL(x2) = x2 +
 = qBWR(x2) +  > qBWR(x2). Therefore, it follows that if qBWR(0) > qL(0), then
there exists 0 < x1 < x2 such that qBWR(x1) = qL(x1). Substituting qBWR(x1) =
qL(x1) = x1 +  in (1.7) gives (1.21). x1 is unique because the left hand side of
(1.21) increases in x. For the other direction, suppose qL(0)  qBWR(0), and the
two functions intersect. The intersection point must be unique because, as we
explained above, it has to satisfy (1.21). If the intersection point is unique, then
the derivatives of the two functions at that point must be equal to each other
(i.e., the derivative of qL(x)  qBWR(x)must be zero). From (1.16) and Proposition
1.3.3, dq
L(x)
dx =
dqBWR(x)
dx is equivalent to
 =
[(1 + )c   s] (1 + ) f (dB)    f (dT )
((1 + )c   s)2( f (dB)    f (dT ))   (1   )(p   s)2 f (qBWR) ;
which can be written as
((1 + )c   s)2 f (dT ) + (1   )(1 + )(p   s)2 f (qBWR) = 0;
which cannot hold because  has an IFR distribution. Therefore, the two func-
tions cannot intersect if qL(0)  qBWR(0). 
Figure 1.2 illustrates the outcome of the newsvendor-bank sub-game. In Fig-
ure 1.2(a), the amount that the bank is willing to lend to the firm with zero
equity is less than the amount that the firm wants to borrow with zero equity.
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Thus, x1 exists. The newsvendor’s order quantity is restricted by the credit limit
when x  x1 and unrestricted otherwise. In Figure 1.2(b), qBWR(0)  qL(0), so
that the newsvendor’s order quantity is nowhere restricted by the credit limit.
The fact that qBWR(0) can be less than qL(0) is interesting because it shows that
the credit line offered to an all-debt newsvendor can exceed its unconstrained
optimal borrowing amount.
We can now specify the equilibrium solution. When qBWR(0) > qL(0), the
newsvendor’s order quantity is given by:
q(x) =
8>>>>>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>:
qL(x) if 0  x  x1 (Case 1);
qBWR(x) if x1 < x < x2 (Case 2);
qBWO(x) if x2  x < x3 (Case 3);
x=c if x3  x  x4 (Case 4);
qNB if x > x4 (Case 5):
(1.22)
Correspondingly, the newsvendor’s expected ending cash position is
(x) =
8>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>:
(p   s)
2666664Z qL
dB
F¯()d   
Z qL
dT
F¯()d
3777775 if 0  x  x1;
(p   s)
2666664Z qBWR
dB
F¯()d   
Z qBWR
dT
F¯()d
3777775 if x1 < x < x2;
(1 + )x   ((1 + )c   s)qBWO + (p   s)
2666664Z qBWO
0
F¯()d   
Z qBWO
dT
F¯()d
3777775
if x2  x < x3;
s
c
x + (p   s)
2666664Z x=c
0
F¯()d   
Z x=c
(c s)x
(p s)c
F¯()d
3777775 if x3  x  x4;
x   (c   s)qNB + (p   s)
2666664Z qNB
0
F¯()d   
Z qNB
c s
p sqNB
F¯()d
3777775 if x > x4:
(1.23)
Note that q(x) and (x) are defined in terms of five cases. In Case 1, the
newsvendor borrows with bankruptcy risk and the bank’s credit limit is bind-
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Figure 1.2: The newsvendor’s and the bank’s optimal order quantities for differ-
ent investment levels. In Figure (a), demand isWeibull with F¯() = exp

 (=)k

.
EF[] = 10 and shape parameter k = 2. p = 2, c = 1, s = 0:4, b = 0:2,  = 0:4, and
 = 0:10. The bank believes that demand is Weibull with EG[] = 9 and shape
parameter k = 2. As a result, qBWR(0) = 11:41 > qL(0) = 8:55, and the credit limit
binds for x 2 [0; x1]. x1 = 1:37, x2 = 6:24, x3 = 9:85, x4 = 10:73, and qNB = 11:17.
In Figure (b), all the model parameters are the same as Figure (a) except s = 0:7.
As a result, qL(0) = 16:31 > qBWR(0) = 12:88, and the credit limit never binds.
x2 = 4:35, x3 = 12:05, x4 = 12:71, and qNB = 12:93.
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ing. In Case 2, the newsvendor borrows with risk, but the bank’s credit limit
is not binding. Cases 1 and 2 are subsumed in scenario (BWR) defined earlier.
In Case 3, the newsvendor borrows without bankruptcy risk; this corresponds
to scenario (BWO). In Case 4, the newsvendor does not borrow and uses up
all the equity to procure inventory. In Case 5, the newsvendor does not bor-
row, is left with excess cash. Cases 4 and 5 correspond to scenario (NB). When
qBWR(0)  qL(0), the equilibrium solution is similar except that Case 1 does not
arise.
In the next section, we will see that some of the five cases do not oc-
cur at equilibrium once the owner’s equity investment problem is introduced.
We present the solution to the investor’s problem, first under the condition
qBWR(0) > qL(0), then under qBWR(0)  qL(0).
1.3.4 The Owner’s Equity Investment Decision
The owner, who has capital K to invest, solves a capital allocation problem to
determine the amount x of equity of the newsvendor and K   x of investment
in an external market asset. We denote the rate of return on the external as-
set by a random variable m with mean ¯m  0. The owner’s expected value
maximization problem is formulated as:
  max
x2[0;K]
(x) = max
x2[0;K]
(x) + E[(1 + m)(K   x)]: (1.24)
The first part of the objective function, (x), denotes the payoff from investing
in the newsvendor and is given by (1.23), whereas the second part denotes the
payoff from investing in the external market. We assume that K is sufficiently
large to procure the optimal order quantity of a pure equity newsvendor, qNB.
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This assumption is made only to ease the presentation because it guarantees the
feasibility of Case 5 in (1.22).
We solve the owner’s problem by determining the optimal solution in each
of the Cases 1-5 and then finding the highest value. We first show that Case 2
(i.e., x 2 (x1; x2)) cannot arise in equilibrium.
Lemma 1.3.3 (x) is convex in x for x 2 (x1; x2). Thus, borrowing with risk but
ordering less than the bank’s optimal order quantity qL cannot arise in equilibrium.
Proof: The order quantity in Case 2, qBWR(x), solves
(1   )(p   s)F¯(qBWR(x)) + [(1 + )c   s]

F¯(dT )   F¯(dB)

= 0; (1.25)
and the owner solves
2 = maxx2[x1;x2]
2(x)
= max
x2[x1;x2]
(1 + ¯m)(K   x) + (p   s)
0BBBBB@Z qBWR(x)
dB
F¯()d   
Z qBWR(x)
dT
F¯()d
1CCCCCA
The first derivative of 2(x) with respect to x is
d2(x)
dx
=  (1 + ¯m) + (1 + )F¯(dB)   F¯(dT )
=  (1 + ¯m) + (1 + ) (1   )(p   s)(1 + )c   s F¯(q
BWR(x)) + F¯(dT ):
The second line follows from (1.25). We drop the superscript BWR for notational
convenience. The second derivative is
 
 
(1   )(1 + ) f (q) +  (1 + )c   s
p   s f (dT )
!
dq
dx
+ 

p   s f (dT ) (1.26)
Using (1.16), (1.26) can be written as
d22(x)
dx2
= (1   ) f(p s) (1+)[(1+)c s]g f (dT ) f (q)+(1+)2[(1+)c s] f (q) f (dB)(1 )(p s)2 f (q) [(1+)c s]2( f (dB)  f (dT ))
+
[(1+)c s]2 f (dT ) f (dB)
(p s)[(1 )(p s)2 f (q) [(1+)c s]2( f (dB)  f (dT ))] ;
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which is non-negative because we assume that p s(1+)c s  1 +  and the denomi-
nators of both terms are positive from (1.16). Hence, we can rule out the interior,
(x1; x2), as the optimal solution will be at x = x1 or x = x2. Furthermore, the ob-
jective function is continuous, which implies that x = x1 is taken in the account
in the first case. 
As a consequence of this lemma, if the firm borrows with bankruptcy risk
then the credit limit is binding. Thus, the optimal equity investment with
bankruptcy risk lies in the range x 2 [0; x1]. Its value is given by the follow-
ing proposition.
Proposition 1.3.4 Let l = 
(1 )(p s)
(1+)c s F¯(x1 + ) + F¯

(1+)c s
p s 

  1 and h = (1 +
) (1 )(p s)(1+)c s F¯() + F¯

(1+)c s
p s 

  1: The optimal equity investment with bankruptcy
risk, xR, is given by
xR =
8>>>>>>><>>>>>>>:
x1 if ¯m < l;
x˜R if ¯m 2 [l; h];
0 if ¯m > h;
(1.27)
where x˜R solves
(1   ) (1 + )(p   s)
(1 + )c   s F¯(x˜R + ) + F¯
 
x˜R + [(1 + )c   s]
p   s
!
  1 = ¯m: (1.28)
Proof: This is Case 1 in which the owner solves
1 = maxx2[0;x1]
1(x)
= max
x2[0;x1]
(1 + ¯m)(K   x) + (p   s)
2666664Z qL(x)
(1+)c s
p s 
F¯()d   
Z qL(x)
dT (x)
F¯()d
3777775 ;
where qL(x) = x +  and dT (x) = x+[(1+)c s]p s . The objective function is concave in
[0; x1] because the second derivative is
 (1   ) (1 + )(p   s)
(1 + )c   s  f (x + )  

p   s f
 
x1 + [(1 + )c   s]
p   s
!
 0:
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Setting the first derivative equal to zero gives (1.28). h is obtained by setting
x = 0 in (1.28). Similarly, l is obtained by setting x = x1. That is,
l = (1   )(1 + )(p   s)(1 + )c   s F¯(x1 + ) + F¯
 
x1 + [(1 + )c   s]
p   s
!
  1
= (1   ) (p   s)
(1 + )c   s F¯(x1 + ) + F¯
 
(1 + )c   s
p   s 
!
  1:
The second equality follows from (1.21). It can be shown that x˜R < 0 when
¯m > h and x˜R > x1 when ¯m < l. Moreover, h > l because the left hand side
of (1.28) is decreasing in x. This proves the result. 
Intuitively, when ¯m is relatively high (i.e., ¯m > h), the owner does not
invest any amount in the newsvendor because her opportunity cost is high.
When ¯m is relatively low (i.e., ¯m < l), the owner invests as much as she can
(i.e., x = x1). For intermediate values of ¯m, the owner chooses a value of equity
in order to match the return from the newsvendor, given by the left hand side
of (1.28), with ¯m.
Now consider the cases when the newsvendor does not face any risk of
bankruptcy, i.e., when x 2 [x2;K]. The optimal equity investment value with-
out bankruptcy risk, xNR is given by the following proposition.
Proposition 1.3.5 Let 2 = 
h
1   F¯

x2
p s
i
and 3 = 
h
1   F¯

c s
p sq
BWO(x3)
i
. The
optimal equity investment in [x2;K], i.e., without bankruptcy risk, is
xNR =
8>>>>>>><>>>>>>>:
x2 if ¯m > 2;
x3 if ¯m 2 (3; 2];
x4 if ¯m 2 [0; 3]:
(1.29)
where x3 solves
F¯

qBWO(x3)

=
¯m[(1 + )c   s]
(1   )(p   s) (Case 3);
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and x4 solves
(1   )(p   s)F¯
 
x4
c
!
+ (c   s)F¯
 
c   s
p   s
"
x4
c
#!
= (1 + ¯m)c   s (Case 4):
Proof: In Case j, j 2 f3; 4; 5g, let  j(x) denote the owner’s payoff function as a
function of the equity amount, and j denote the owner’s optimal payoff. In
Case 3, the owner solves
3 = maxx2[x2;x3]
3(x)
= max
x2[x2;x3]
(1 + ¯m)(K   x) + (1 + )x + ((1 + )c + s)qBWO(x)
+(p   s)
2666664Z qBWO(x)
0
F¯()d   
Z qBWO(x)
dT
F¯()d
3777775 :
Taking a derivative with respect to x and using the definition of qBWO(x) from
(1.8), we get
d3
dx
=    ¯m   F¯ (dT (x)) =  (1   )(p   s)(1 + )c   s F¯

qBWO(x)

  ¯m: (1.30)
The second derivative with respect to x is   (1 )(p s)(1+)c s dq
BWO(x)
dx f

qBWO(x)

; which
is negative because qBWO is increasing in x by Proposition 1.3.2. Therefore, the
owner’s problem is concave in Case 3. Concavity implies that (1.30) attains its
maximum at x = x2 and its minimum at x = x3, which implies that the optimal
solution is in (x2; x3) only if 0 is between the values of the first derivative at x = x2
and x = x3. The first derivatives at x = x2 and x = x3 are 
(1 )(p s)
(1+)c s F¯

qBWO(x2)

 ¯m
and  (1 )(p s)(1+)c s F¯

qBWO(x3)

  ¯m, respectively. Let 2 =  (1 )(p s)(1+)c s F¯

qBWO(x2)

=

h
1   F¯

dT

qBWO(x2); x2
i
. The last equality follows from (1.8). Similarly, let
3 = 
(1 )(p s)
(1+)c s F¯

qBWO(x3)

= 
h
1   F¯

dT

qBWO(x3); x3
i
. Then the optimal eq-
uity investment in Case 3, x3, is given by
x3 =
8>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>:
x2 if ¯m > 2;
x˜3 if ¯m 2 [3; 2];
x3 if ¯m < 3;
(1.31)
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where x˜3 is obtained by setting (1.30) equal to zero.
In Case 4, the owner solves
4 = maxx2[x3;x4]
4(x)
= max
x2[x3;x4]
(1 + ¯m)(K   x) + sc x + (p   s)
2666664Z x=c
0
F¯()d   
Z x=c
(c s)x
(p s)c
F¯()d
3777775 :
This objective function is concave in x because the second derivative is  (1  
) p sc2 f (x=c)   

c s
c
2 1
p s f

(c s)x
(p s)c

 0. The first derivative is
 (1 + ¯m) + sc + (1   )
p   s
c
F¯
 x
c

+ 
c   s
c
F¯
 
(c   s)x
(p   s)c
!
; (1.32)
which is decreasing in x. q˜(x) is continuous by Proposition 1.3.2. Therefore,
x3=c = qBWO(x3), and the first derivative at x = x3 is
 (1 + ¯m) + sc +
p   s
c
 
(1   )F¯

qBWO(x3)

+ 
c   s
p   s F¯
 
c   s
p   sq
BWO(x3)
!!
: (1.33)
Using (1.8), we know that F¯

c s
p sq
BWO(x3)

= 1  (1 )(p s)(1+)c s F¯(qBWO(x3)). Substituting
it into (1.33) gives  (1 )(p s)(1+)c s F¯(q
BWO(x3))   ¯m; which is equal to 3   ¯m. Similar
analysis shows that the derivative at x = x4 is equal to  ¯m. Therefore,
x4 =
8>>>><>>>>:
x3 if ¯m > 3;
x˜4 if ¯m 2 [0; 3];
where x˜4 is obtained by setting (1.32) equal to zero.
In Case 5, the owner solves
5 = maxx2[x4;K]
5(x)
= max
x2[x4;K]
(1 + ¯m)(K   x) + x   (c   s) qNB
+(p   s)
2666664Z qNB
0
F¯()d   
Z qNB
c s
p sqNB
F¯()d
3777775 ;
which is linear in x. Therefore, x5 = x4 because ¯m  0.
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The objective function (x) is concave in all three cases, and the first deriva-
tives from the right and left are equal to each other at every switching point.
Therefore, collecting these three cases together gives the optimal solution under
no borrowing. 
Here x3 corresponds to the optimal equity investment value if the firm bor-
rows without risk (i.e., if the optimal equity investment is in (x2; x3]), and x4
corresponds to the optimal equity investment value if the firm does not bor-
row (i.e., if the optimal equity investment is in (x3; x4]). To derive the solution
in Proposition 1.3.5, we show that the owner’s objective function is concave
in Cases 3-5, and the first derivatives from the right and left are equal to each
other at every switching point. Therefore, there is a unique local optimum, and
collecting the three cases together gives the optimal solution under no borrow-
ing. The owner’s solution lies at the left boundary x2 when ¯m > 2 because
the external asset offers a very attractive investment alternative. As the exter-
nal investment alternative becomes less promising (i.e., when ¯m 2 (3; 2]), the
owner uses a mix of riskless debt and equity to finance her firm’s operations.
For smaller ¯m values (i.e., for ¯m 2 [0; 3]), the owner creates a pure equity firm
by investing x4, which sets the after-tax return from the newsvendor equal to
¯m.
Let R(¯m) and 

NR(¯m) denote the owner’s payoff functions with and with-
out bankruptcy risk, respectively. We find that R and 

NR are both increasing
in ¯m, but R is increasing at a faster rate. Moreover, 

R > 

NR when ¯m is suffi-
ciently large. Therefore, ifR(0) > 

NR(0) at ¯m = 0, then the two functions never
intersect and investing with risk is optimal for all ¯m  0. This scenario can arise
if the bank offers a sufficiently attractive borrowing opportunity with a high
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credit limit and/or a low interest rate. On the other hand, if R(0)  NR(0),
then the two functions intersect at a unique threshold value of ¯m. Let ˜ de-
note this threshold. If ¯m  ˜, then the owner invests enough equity into the
newsvendor that the probability of bankruptcy is zero. Otherwise, the owner
finds it optimal to invest with bankruptcy risk. Proposition 1.3.6 formalizes this
result.
Proposition 1.3.6 If R(0) > 

NR(0) then investing with bankruptcy risk is optimal
for all ¯m  0. Otherwise, there exists a unique threshold return value ˜  0 such
that investing without bankruptcy risk is optimal when ¯m  ˜ and investing with
bankruptcy risk is optimal otherwise.
Proof: We first show that both R and 

NR increase in ¯m, but 

R increases at a
faster rate. For s 2 fR;NRg,
ds
d¯m
=
@s(¯m; x)
@¯m
+
@s(¯m; x)
@x
jx=x @x

@¯m
=
@s(¯m; x)
@¯m
:
This is due to @s(¯m;x)
@x jx=x = 0 because x solves the first order condition of the
owner’s objective function. Therefore,
dR
d¯m
=
8>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>:
K   x1 if ¯m < l;
K   x˜R if ¯m 2 [l; h];
K if ¯m > h;
(1.34)
and
dNR
d¯m
=
8>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>:
K   x4 if ¯m 2 [0; 3];
K   x3 if ¯m 2 (3; 2];
K   x2 if ¯m > 2:
(1.35)
In addition, one can show that x4 > x

3 > x2, x1 > x˜R, and x2 > x1. Also note
that K   x4 > 0 because we assumed that the owner has sufficient capital to
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procure the optimal order quantity for a pure equity newsvendor. Therefore,
dR
d¯m
>
dNR
d¯m
 0, which implies that if R(0) > NR(0) then investing with risk
optimal for all ¯m  0 because the two functions never intersect.
For a large ¯m value, investing with bankruptcy risk option leads to no in-
vestment in the newsvendor (i.e., x1 = 0). However, the owner invests x2 if she
chooses to invest without bankruptcy risk. Therefore,
NR   R = (1 + ¯m)(K   x2) + (1 + )x2   ((1 + )c   s)qBWO(x2)
+(p   s)
2666664Z qBWO(x2)
0
F¯()d   
Z qBWO(x2)
dT (qBWO(x2);x2)
F¯()d
3777775
 
0BBBBB@(1 + ¯m)K + (p   s)Z 
(1+)c s
p s 
F¯()d
1CCCCCA
=  (1 + ¯m)x2 +C2
where C2 is a constant. Hence, R > 

NR for a sufficiently large ¯m value. Com-
bining this result with d

R
d¯m
>
dNR
d¯m
 0 implies that if R(0)  NR(0) then there
must exist a unique ˜  0 such that R(˜) = NR(˜). Hence, investing without
bankruptcy risk is optimal when ¯m  ˜, and investing with bankruptcy risk is
optimal otherwise. 
For completeness, it may be noted that the above solutions continue to hold
if the credit limit is never binding, i.e., in the scenario shown in Figure 1.2(b).
When qL(0)  qBWR(0), the bank’s credit limit is greater than the newsvendor’s
optimal purchase quantity for x 2 (0; x2). Thus, Case 1, i.e., borrowing with
risk and ordering the bank’s optimal quantity, does not arise because the credit
limit is never binding. Further, from Lemma 1.3.3, the owner’s payoff function
is convex in Case 2. Therefore, the optimal solution for the borrowing with risk
scenarios is either at x = 0 or x = x2. The optimal solution for borrowing without
bankruptcy risk, Proposition 1.3.5, remains unchanged because Cases 3-5 are
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unaffected by the credit limit. Combining these together, the owner’s global
optimal solution when qL(0)  qBWR(0) is at either x = 0 or x = xNR. Writing the
owner’s payoff functions for x = 0 and x = xNR and comparing them, we again
obtain a threshold value such that x = 0 is optimal for ¯m values that exceed the
threshold and x = xNR is optimal for ¯m values that are below the threshold. We
omit this step because it is analogous to Proposition 1.3.6.
In general, the value of ˜ can be determined by a numerical search technique
to find the intersection point between R(¯m) and 

NR(¯m).
Example 1.3.1 ( = 0) Table 1.1 presents all possible equilibrium outcomes in the sim-
plified case with zero taxes. The solution can be a pure equity firm, one with both debt
and equity, or a pure debt firm. The equilibrium order quantity equals q˜NR, q˜R or ,
respectively, in the three cases, where q˜NR  q˜R  . Which of these three cases arises at
equilibrium depends on market conditions through ¯m;  and the bank’s belief. Observe
that the overage and underage costs of the classical newsvendor model are adjusted to
capture market conditions. For example, ¯m can be interpreted as the cost of capital of
a pure equity firm, and is incorporated in q˜NR because the cost of purchasing one unit
equals (1 + ¯m)c. The borrowing interest  is additionally incorporated in the formulas
for q˜R and . As per Proposition 1.3.6, any of the three cases in Table 1.1 can occur when
˜ exits, but the pure equity case does not occur otherwise.
The main financial implication of this example is that a debt-equity mix or
a pure debt firm can occur at equilibrium even in the absence of taxes. This re-
sult differs from the rationale behind the tradeoff theory originating from Kraus
and Litzenberger [48], in which the optimal capital structure balances a trade-
off between tax benefits of debt and cost of bankruptcy. Taxation induces the
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Table 1.1: Possible equilibrium values of inventory, debt, and equity in the ab-
sence of taxation when ˜ exits (i.e., when R and 

NR intersect). If 

R and 

NR
never intersect then the equilibrium outcome is debt equity mix for 0  ¯m  h
and pure debt for ¯m > h. The values of  and  are defined in Proposition
1.3.3. q˜NR and q˜R can be obtained by setting  = 0 in Propositions 1.3.4 and 1.3.5.
Borrowing without risk cannot arise as an equilibrium outcome when  = 0.
Possible Case Order Quantity (q) Equity (x) Debt (w)
Pure equity, ¯m 2 [0; ˜) q˜NR = F¯ 1

(1+¯m)c s
p s

cq˜NR 0
Debt equity mix, ¯m 2 (˜; h] q˜R = F¯ 1

(1+¯m)(c  s1+ )
p s

q˜R 

s
1+ q˜R +


Pure debt, ¯m > h  0 c
firm to borrow because interest expense is tax deductible, but excessive bor-
rowing leads to financial distress. In contrast, our example shows that if the
lending terms offered by the bank (i.e., the interest rate and the credit limit)
are favorable then the firm might borrow even in the absence of taxation be-
cause borrowing increases the expected return to the owner and shifts the risk
of bankruptcy to the bank. Conversely, if the lending terms are not favorable to
the owner then the firm might choose to use pure equity even in the absence of
bankruptcy costs. (In our model, bankruptcy costs are embedded in , and our
analysis remain valid when b = 0.) Thus, taxation and bankruptcy costs are of
secondary importance for the firm’s capital structure compared to market con-
ditions and firm characteristics (e.g., demand distribution, profitability), both
of which shape the firm’s borrowing ability and the owner’s operational and
financial decisions.
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1.4 Managerial Implications
1.4.1 Information Asymmetry
The bank’s view of the newsvendor’s demand may be optimistic or pessimistic
compared to the true distribution. If F has first order stochastic dominance
over G, then the bank is pessimistic, otherwise it is optimistic. As the bank gets
more pessimistic, it tightens the credit limit as shown in the credit limit formula
(1.19). Credit tightening decreases the firm’s leverage as expected. If this were
the only consideration, we would expect the order quantity to be decreasing in
the bank’s degree of pessimism. However, the degree of pessimism also affects
the owner’s equity investment decision through ˜ and the credit limit. As a
result, the optimal order quantity need not always decrease as the bank gets
more pessimistic.
Table 1.2 illustrates this outcome by showing the equilibrium order quan-
tity in two scenarios, (i) when the bank is optimistic and (ii) when the bank is
pessimistic. We vary ¯m and keep all other parameters identical between the
two scenarios in order to illustrate the outcomes. In reality, ¯m may be corre-
lated with other model parameters. Since ˜ varies with the degree of optimism,
we find that ˜ equals 8.5% and 11.1% in the games with the optimistic and the
pessimistic banks, respectively. When ¯m is smaller than 8.5%, the owner consti-
tutes the newsvendor as a pure equity firm. Therefore, information asymmetry
has no effect on operational investment because the equilibrium order quantity
is the same regardless of whether the bank is optimistic or pessimistic.
As ¯m increases, it exceeds the value of ˜ for the optimistic bank. Therefore,
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Table 1.2: Equilibrium order quantity and Debt to Assets (DA) ratio as a func-
tion of the expected market return. Demand is exponential with mean 10. Opti-
mistic, and pessimistic banks believe that demand is exponential with mean 12
and 8, respectively. p = 1, c = 0:6, b = 0:2, s = 0:1,  = 0:15,  = 0. When the bank
is pessimistic, the owner chooses pure equity financing if 0  ¯m  11:1%, debt-
equity mix if 11:1% < ¯m  42:0%, and pure debt financing if ¯m > 42:0%. When
the bank is optimistic, the owner chooses pure equity financing if 0  ¯m  8:5%,
debt-equity mix if 8:5% < ¯m  32:0%, and pure debt financing if ¯m > 32:0%.
Pessimistic Bank Optimistic Bank
¯m Order Quantity DA Ratio Order Quantity DA Ratio
5% 5.30 0 5.30 0
10% 4.75 0 4.51 0.61
25% 3.06 0.60 3.06 0.83
50% 1.62 1 2.44 1
when faced with an optimistic bank, the owner finds it attractive to contribute
less equity and borrow with bankruptcy risk. Whereas when faced with a pes-
simistic bank, the owner continues to contribute more equity and have zero
borrowing. As a result, for ¯m 2 [0:085; 0:111), the equilibrium order quantity is
higher when the owner faces a pessimistic bank.
As ¯m exceeds 11.1%, the newsvendor borrows up to the credit limit regard-
less of the bank’s view. The owner compensates for the tighter credit limit given
by the pessimistic bank by contributing more equity in the newsvendor. As a
result, the equilibrium order quantity is unaffected by information asymmetry
even though financial leverage varies.
In summary, information asymmetry leads to some counterintuitive find-
ings. There is a range of values of ¯m (i.e., 8:5% < ¯m  11:1%) for which
an optimistic bank leads to a lower order quantity because the owner finds
it attractive to contribute less equity. In a higher range of values of ¯m (i.e.,
11:1% < ¯m  32:0%), information asymmetry affects leverage, but has no effect
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on the order quantity because tighter credit environment provided by a pes-
simistic bank is compensated by more equity. Finally, when ¯m is very high
(e.g., 50%), tighter credit due to information asymmetry depresses operational
investment.
1.4.2 Probability of Bankruptcy
Our model shows that the probability of bankruptcy depends on the param-
eters of the newsvendor model, the attractiveness of the external investment
alternative, and information asymmetry. At equilibrium,
Pr(Bankruptcy) =
8>>>><>>>>:
0 if ˜ exists and ¯m  ˜;
F

G¯ 1
h
1   c(1+)c s

p s
p s+b
i
if ˜ does not exit or ¯m > ˜:
(1.36)
To see this, note that if the firm borrows with risk, then the credit limit
is always binding. Thus, bankruptcy occurs if the demand is less than
dB(qL(x); x). The probability of occurrence of this event is Pr (  dB(x + ; x)) =
F

G¯ 1
h
1   c(1+)c s

p s
p s+b
i
.
This characterization shows that the equilibrium probability of bankruptcy
is either zero or a fixed scalar depending on the regime in which the equilibrium
solution lies. The fixed scalar arises because the bank’s profit function in (1.19)
is a newsvendor-like formula. That is, similar to the newsvendor model, the op-
timal solution for the bank fixes the tail probability of demand. In Section 1.6.2,
we show that a similar result in which the probability of bankruptcy is either
zero or a positive scalar also arises when the bank optimizes the interest rate
without imposing a credit limit. Hence, this result is due to the bank’s ability to
influence the owner’s equity investment decision, not due to the bank’s lending
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model.
The bankruptcy formula in (1.36) suggests hypotheses regarding the drivers
of bankruptcy risk at equilibrium. The effect of information asymmetry is
captured by the term F(G¯ 1()). It implies that there is a lower probability of
bankruptcy if the bank is pessimistic about the demand distribution. This oc-
curs because the credit limit is smaller. Moreover, the value of ˜ is larger so
that there is a smaller range of values of ¯m for which bankruptcy can occur.
Conversely, the bankruptcy probability is higher when the bank is optimistic.
Besides information asymmetry, we observe that the probability of bankruptcy
increases in p, s=c, and  because the bank is willing to allow the newsvendor
to have a higher order quantity as p, s=c or  increases. It decreases in b because
the bank is more conservative when the bankruptcy cost is high.
Additionally, the market return ¯m and the threshold ˜ affect the bankruptcy
probability by determining whether the owner will inject enough equity to
avoid borrowing with risk. Holding all other parameters constant, a higher
expected return in the market can increase the probability of bankruptcy from 0
to F

G¯ 1
h
1   c(1+)c s

p s
p s+b
i
because the owner has other attractive investment
alternatives.
1.4.3 Collateral Value of Inventory
Linking the credit limit to inventory enables the bank to secure the loan and
ensure that it is used for the intended purpose of inventory procurement alone.
In this section, we derive the collateral value of inventory q that the bank can
use to implement ABL. According to Proposition 1.3.3, the bank sets the maxi-
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mum order quantity equal to qL(x) = x + . This formula allows us to write the
credit limit in an alternative form, i.e.,  = qcq, because the excess cash will be
zero when the firm uses its entire credit line. Using the expressions for  and 
from Proposition 1.3.3, we find that the bank can limit the newsvendor to order
a maximum of qL(x) by setting q =
cqL(x) x
cqL(x) . Writing q as a function of x gives
q = 1 x
. 
(1+)c
(1+)c s x + c

. Thus, the optimal collateral value of inventory depends
on the newsvendor parameters, the bank’s belief, and equity. Interestingly, q
decreases in x because offering a high credit limit to a firm that already has high
equity could allow the firm to order an excessive amount, which could make
inventory liquidation more likely. The bank prevents this undesirable outcome
by lowering q. It is also worthwhile to note that q decreases in . That is, a
pessimistic bank uses a lower q value, which leads to a tighter credit limit.
In practice, asset based lenders use simple rules of thumb, such as historical
salvage value, to determine q. Our model shows that they can improve their
practice by tailoring the collateral value of inventory to a firm using objective
optimization criteria. Moreover, they do not need to disclose the details of these
criteria to a potential borrower because specifying  and q will be sufficient to
offer an asset based loan secured solely by inventory.
Consider the example presented in Table 1.2. The salvage value s is 0.1 and
the purchase cost c is 0.6 for both the optimistic and the pessimistic banks.
Thus, the rule of thumb gives q = s=c = 0:167 (i.e., setting the credit limit
 = sq). However, the optimal q varies due to the differences in the banks’
beliefs. For instance, when ¯m = 0:10, we find that the pessimistic bank
sets q equal to 0.39 and the equilibrium outcome is (q;w; x) = (4:75; 0; 2:85),
whereas the optimistic bank sets it equal to 0:61 and the equilibrium outcome
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is (q;w; x) = (4:51; 1:65; 1:06). The main difference between optimizing the credit
limit and determining it using the rule of thumb arises due to the way inven-
tory is assessed. While the asset based loan is based on the starting inventory,
the amount of inventory that will have to be liquidated in case of a bankruptcy
is random and depends on the realized demand. Our model takes this into ac-
count through the bank’s belief, whereas the rule of thumb omits the random-
ness in demand.
1.4.4 Capital Structure at Equilibrium
Through the interaction of ABL and the newsvendor model, our analysis leads
to empirically testable predictions regarding the relationship between a firm’s
operational characteristics and its capital structure. We present three such pre-
dictions. Future empirical research can examine the extent to which capital
structure decisions can be explained by operational dynamics.
1. Leverage is negatively correlated with demand uncertainty. The newsvendor
model enables us to model the relationship between demand uncertainty and
leverage. Demand uncertainty can be measured by the coefficient of variation
of demand. When the profit margin is sufficiently high, the equilibrium order
quantity increases in demand uncertainty due to a rise in the safety stock. On
the other hand, the minimum credit line offered by the bank declines because
the bank wants to limit its losses, which are more likely when the demand is
more uncertain. An increase in the equilibrium order quantity and a decrease in
the minimum credit line imply an increase in the equity investment. Thus, the
debt-equity ratio declines. Figure 1.3(a) illustrates this reasoning.
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To the best of our knowledge, no papers use demand uncertainty as a proxy
for operational risk within a capital structure framework, but empirical evi-
dence generated by other risk proxies suggests that leverage generally has a
negative correlation with risk (Myers [64]). Despite this evidence, the relation-
ship between risk and leverage is ambiguous in the tradeoff theory and the
pecking order theory models (Frank and Goyal [35] and references therein).
Hence, our model presents a theoretical link between operational risk and lever-
age that may help address this gap.
2. There is a non-monotone relationship between profitability and leverage. The
equilibrium order quantity increases in the after tax profit margin because the
newsvendor provides a more attractive investment opportunity. Meanwhile,
both the owner’s tendency to inject equity and the bank’s tendency to provide a
loan increase in the newsvendor’s profitability. As shown in Figure 1.3(b), these
dynamics create a U-shaped relationship between profitability and the debt-
equity ratio. This result arises because debt and equity increase at different
rates, which makes their ratio non-monotone.
The majority of the tradeoff theory models predict a positive correlation be-
tween profitability and leverage, whereas the pecking order theory models pre-
dict a negative correlation (Frank and Goyal [35]). Both predictions are at odds
with the empirical evidence. For example, the empirical findings of Xu and
Birge [11] verify the existence of a U-shaped relation between profitability and
leverage when the profit margin is sufficiently high. Similar to our work, Birge
and Xu provide an operational justification for this observation. They also dis-
cuss the shortcomings of the related empirical studies that seek to analyze a
seemingly non-monotone relationship using linear regression.
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Figure 1.3: The equilibrium capital structure as a function of demand uncer-
tainty and profitability. ¯m = 0:15,  = 0:10, p = 6, c = 1, s = 0:2, b = 0:2, and
 = 0:3. In Figure (a), demand is Weibull with EF[] = 10, and the bank believes
that it is Weibull with EG[] = 9. We vary the shape and scale parameters of F
and G to measure the impact of demand variability. In Figure (b), demand is
exponential with EF[] = 10, and the bank believes that it is exponential with
EG[] = 9. We vary p between 4 and 8 to measure the impact of firm profitability.
We define the profit margin as (p   c)=(p   s).
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3. The newsvendor model can explain intra-industry differences in leverage. The
empirical corporate finance literature shows that capital structure varies both
across industries and across firms within the same industry (Leary and Graham
[51]). In fact, a substantial amount of unexplained variation in capital structure
is firm specific and time invariant (Lemmon et al. [55]). However, the trade-
off theory and the pecking order theory models cannot accurately explain firm
specific differences in capital structure (Myers [64] and Frank and Goyal [35], re-
spectively). Our model provides a theoretical framework to justify and analyze
these differences. For example, the newsvendor model predicts a positive corre-
lation between inventory liquidation value and leverage. s=c in the newsvendor
model captures the relative liquidation value of the firm’s inventory. The asset
based credit limit increases in s=c by (1.19). That is, tangible assets provide more
debt capacity, which leads to a high debt-equity ratio for a borrower firm. This
prediction is consistent with the empirical evidence suggesting that leverage
has a positive correlation with the firm’s assets’ liquidation value (Harris and
Raviv [40] and references therein).
To sum up, our model’s ability to capture the details of operational and fi-
nancial dynamics in a realistic framework sheds light on some empirical ob-
servations that cannot be accurately explained by the mainstream theoretical
models. This implication is well aligned with the recent studies showing the
superiority of equilibrium models in explaining capital structure choice (e.g.,
MacKay and Phillips [58] and references therein).
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1.5 Conclusions
We characterize the equilibrium order quantity, probability of bankruptcy, and
capital structure of a firm in a game played between a small business owner and
an asset based lender. Our results are driven by the economic considerations
of the risk of bankruptcy, the expected return to the owner of the firm, and
the credit limit imposed by the bank. Taxation and cost of bankruptcy play a
secondary role. In fact, all of our results go through under zero taxes and zero
cost of bankruptcy. Moreover, the form of the probability of bankruptcy is the
same even without information asymmetry or under interest rate optimization
(as shown in Section 1.6).
Our study falls in a rich area of research. Issues examined in this chapter
can be studied under alternative models, and some aspects of our model can
be generalized in future research. For example, players, esp. the owner, may be
modeled as expected utilitymaximizers, and agency issues can be added. It may
also be productive to allow trading between the bank and the owner or to re-
place them with two investor classes. There may be competition among banks,
which can affect the equilibrium outcome under information asymmetry. The
bank’s strategic interactions with the owner can also be modeled. Section 1.6
provides a starting point for such an analysis by the deriving the optimal lend-
ing interest rate, which is a function of ¯m. Another extension is to introduce a
joint distribution for  and ¯m to capture the correlation between consumption
and macroeconomic conditions. Signaling and firm-bank coordination through
amenu of contracts can also be considered. For example, the bankmay consider
using a signaling mechanism to infer the true demand distribution of a poten-
tial borrower. However, designing such a mechanism is not straightforward
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because firms with bad demand prospects may replicate good firms’ actions.
As a result, a pooling equilibrium may exist in which order quantities and bor-
rowing amounts become uninformative; see Greenwald and Stiglitz [39] (page
37) for a similar argument. Another potential direction is to extend our model
to a multi-period setting in order to capture time-varying bankruptcy risk. Fi-
nally, future empirical researchmay examine the predictions emerging from our
study regarding the links between operational parameters, capital structure and
the probability of bankruptcy.
1.6 Model Extension: Interest Rate Optimization
Our assumption of fixed interest rate prompts two questions: (i) why does
the bank not optimize the interest rate for an individual borrower firm, and
(ii) is our result on probability of bankruptcy dependent on the assumption of
fixed interest rate. In Section 1.1, we showed that interest rates are capped for
some loans in the economy, and for such loans, the assumption of fixed interest
rates is appropriate. In addition, our work differs from the literature in oper-
ations wherein banks optimize interest rates or wherein the interest rate is set
to achieve the risk-free rate of return on average because equity is a decision
variable and there is information asymmetry.
The literature in economics shows that at any given interest rate, under in-
formation asymmetry, firms with bad projects (i.e., poor demand prospects in
our model) will have a tendency to over-borrow compared to firms with good
projects. This creates the well known adverse selection problem for the bank
because increasing the interest rate can increase the riskiness of the bank’s loan
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portfolio by changing the set of borrowing firms and inducing firms to make
riskier investments (Stiglitz and Weiss [77]). (A riskier investment corresponds
to a higher order quantity in our model.) As a result, credit rationing, under
which some borrowers receive smaller loans than they demand, may exist be-
cause it may not be optimal for the bank to increase the interest rate until loan
supply equals loan demand. Greenwald and Stigliz [39] (page 15) explain this
market failure (i.e., supply-demand mismatch) by stating that “in credit mar-
kets, it is by now well established that lenders who are less well-informed than
borrowers about the risk characteristics of the borrower’s investment projects
may well respond by fixing interest rates and (under certain conditions) ra-
tioning credit.”
The implication of adverse selection for ourmodel is that the lending interest
rate should be optimized for a population of borrowers, not for an individual firm.
Such a population can be defined based on model primitives, including G, p,
c, and s. Therefore, if the bank has the flexibility to optimize the interest rate,
then the optimal interest rate will be a function of model primitives, but will not
depend on the owner’s actions. Hence,  continues to be exogenous for a given
firm. This result arises because making  a function of x, w and/or q amplifies
adverse selection by urging firms with good (bad) demand prospects to borrow
less (more).
This section explores these implications in detail.
1. We show that increasing the interest rate does not help the bank because
it leads to an equilibrium outcome in which the interest rate is very high
and only firms with poor demand prospects borrow.
2. We present the bank’s interest rate optimization problem in the context
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of information asymmetry, and validate that the optimal interest rate that
maximizes the bank’s expected profit underG is a function of model prim-
itives, including ¯m,G, p, and c, but is independent of the owner’s and the
firm’s decisions (i.e., x, w, and q). Thus, the fixed interest rate  in our
model can be interpreted as the optimal interest rate for a population of
borrowers or an exogenous interest rate imposed by a government agency.
This result holds regardless of whether the bank imposes a credit limit or
not.
3. We show numerically that imposing a credit limit increases the bank’s
true expected profit because it prevents over-borrowing. Moreover, if the
bank imposes a credit limit then charging an exogenous interest rate that
is lower than the optimal interest rate under G increases the bank’s true
expected profit. However, if the bank does not impose a credit limit then
charging an exogenous interest rate that is lower than the optimal interest
rate under G decreases the bank’s true expected profit.
We illustrate interest rate optimization using a population of two borrow-
ers. Suppose there are two owners with two proprietary newsvendor type in-
vestment opportunities. Firm i faces random demand i characterized by Fi,
i 2 f1; 2g. The bank cannot distinguish among the firms, and believes that both
firms face identically distributed demand functions characterized by G. We re-
fer to G as the bank’s belief. ¯m, p, c, and K are identical for both owners and
common knowledge to the bank. For analytical tractability, we focus on a spe-
cial case in which the tax rate , bankruptcy cost b and salvage value s are zero.
Our results continue to apply when these quantities are positive.
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1.6.1 Interest Rate Optimization with A Credit Limit
In this section, we show how the bank can find the optimal  value that maxi-
mizes its expected profits under its belief G given the credit limit computed in
Proposition 1.3.3. Setting s = b = 0 and replacing F with G in Example 1.3.1
show that a pure equity (PE) firm facing G orders qPE = G¯ 1

(1+¯m)c
p

. The corre-
sponding expected profit for the owner under the bank’s belief G is
PEG  (1 + ¯m)

K   cqPE

+ p
Z qPE
0
G¯()d: (1.37)
Similarly, a firm that uses a mix of debt and equity (DE) orders qDE =
G¯ 1

(1+¯m)c
p

, which is equal to qPE. The corresponding expected profit for the
owner under G is equal to
DEG ()  (1 + ¯m)

K   c(qPD   )

+ p
Z qPD
(1+)c
p 
G¯()d; (1.38)
where  = p(1+)cG¯
 1  1
1+

. Lastly, a pure debt (PD) firm orders , and the owner’s
expected profit under G is
PDG ()  (1 + ¯m)K + p
Z 
(1+)c
p 
G¯()d: (1.39)
Under the bank’s belief G, the firm should borrow if  is such that
maxfPDG ();DEG ()g  PEG . This inequality is a participation constraint, which
ensures that the owner is better off by using pure debt financing or a mix of debt
and equity rather than pure equity financing. Following Proposition 1.3.3 and
Example 1.3.1, if the firm borrows, the bank’s expected profit under G will be
equal to p
R (1+)c
p 
0
G¯()d   c. Hence, the bank solves the following interest rate
optimization problem:
max
0
p
Z (1+)c
p 
0
G¯()d   c
s.t. maxfPDG ();DEG ()g  PEG :
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We observe that the optimal interest rate under a credit limit C is a function
of model primitives, including G, because the true distribution F¯i, actual order
quantity or equity investment do not appear in the above optimization problem.
Hence, the optimal interest rate C(p; c; ¯m;G) is exogenously determined for a
potential borrower.
When salvage value, taxation, and bankruptcy costs are added to the model,
the equilibrium order quantity and starting equity become implicit functions
of the interest rate. The bank can find the firm’s best response, which consists
of an order quantity q(;G) and a starting equity x(;G). In fact, replacing F¯
terms with G¯ in Propositions 1.3.4 and 1.3.5 gives the potential equilibrium out-
comes under the bank’s belief for a given . Once the bank computes x(;G)
and q(;G) for a continuum of  values, it can find the optimal  value that
maximizes its expected profits. Despite being notationally cumbersome, this
optimization exercise still has a single decision variable . Hence, C is still ex-
ogenously determined, but becomes a function of additional model primitives,
including , b, and s. The optimal solution under taxation, bankruptcy costs,
and a positive salvage value, C(p; c; s; ; b; ¯m;G), corresponds to the optimal
interest rate for the bank’s problem we present in Section 1.3.
1.6.2 Interest Rate Optimization without A Credit Limit
Another lending model for the bank is unsecured lending without a credit limit,
as studied by Dada and Hu [26]. The interest rate is the only decision variable
for the bank.
The newsvendor-bank interaction in this model is similar to the case that we
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illustrate in Figure 1.2(b). That is, for a given starting equity x and interest rate
, the firm’s order quantity is not restricted by a credit limit. The absence of
the credit limit implies that if x 2 [0; x2] then the firm borrows with risk, and
the order quantity solves (1.7). Furthermore, as we show in Lemma 1.3.3, the
owner’s profit function is convex in the interval in which the firm borrows with
risk without a binding credit limit. This convexity result implies that in the
absence of a credit limit, if the owner decides to borrow then it is optimal to
create a pure debt firm.
Continuing the special case with  = 0 and s = b = 0, the bank believes that if
an owner chooses to borrow, she creates a pure debt firm, and the order quantity
solves
q˜PD = G¯ 1
 
(1 + )c
p
G¯
 
(1 + )c
p
q˜PD
!!
: (1.40)
This result follows from setting , b, s equal to zero in Proposition 1. As a result,
the owner’s expected ending cash position under G is
˜PDG ()  (1 + ¯m)K + p
Z q˜PD
(1+)c
p q˜
PD
G¯()d: (1.41)
Another alternative for the owner is to create a pure equity firm. This case
is identical to the pure equity case presented under a credit limit. That is, a
firm facing G orders q˜PE = G¯ 1

(1+¯m)c
p

, and the owner’s expected ending cash
position is
˜PEG  (1 + ¯m)

K   q˜PE

+ p
Z q˜PE
0
G¯()d: (1.42)
The bank believes that the owner creates a pure debt firm if ˜PDG ()  ˜PEG . Oth-
erwise, she creates a pure equity firm. If the owner creates a pure debt firm,
then the bank’s expected profit underG will be equal to p
R (1+)c
p q˜
PD
0
G¯()d   cq˜PD.
Hence, the bank solves the following interest rate optimization problem:
max
0
p
Z (1+)c
p q˜
PD
0
G¯()d   cq˜PD
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s.t. ˜PDG ()  ˜PEG :
Similar to the interest rate optimization with a credit limit, this problem has a
single decision variable , and the optimal interest rate is a function of model
primitives, including G. Hence, the optimal interest rate under unconstrained
borrowing U is exogenously determined for a potential borrower.
The equilibrium probability of bankruptcy of a firm i is either zero or a pos-
itive scalar because firm i is either a pure equity or a pure debt firm. If it is a
pure equity firm, then the equilibrium order quantity q˜PDi solves
q˜PDi = F¯
 1
i
0BBBBBB@

1 + U

c
p
F¯i
0BBBBBB@

1 + U

c
p
q˜PDi
1CCCCCCA
1CCCCCCA : (1.43)
Hence, the probability of bankruptcy is equal to F

(1+U)c
p q˜
PD
i

. Obtaining a
fixed probability of bankruptcy result under interest rate optimization without
a credit limit shows the robustness of the equilibrium probability of bankruptcy
result we present in Section 1.4.2.
Once again, adding taxation and bankruptcy costs to the model makes the
optimal interest a function of additional model primitives, but U remains ex-
ogenous.
It is worthwhile to note that this optimization procedure is similar to the
one presented by Dada and Hu (2008). Dada and Hu find the equilibrium in-
terest rate and order quantity in a game played between a newsvendor firm
and a profit maximizing bank. Starting equity is given, and the bank, which
has full information about the firm’s demand prospects, determines the interest
rate that maximizes its expected profit. In their model, the equilibrium interest
rate is a function of the firm’s starting equity because starting equity is not a
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decision variable. Furthermore, adverse selection does not exist because there
is no information asymmetry.
1.6.3 Adverse Selection with A Credit Limit
While optimizing the interest rate for a population of borrowers under a credit
limit increases the bank’s expected profit under its belief, it can still lead to lower
profits due to asymmetric information. We illustrate the existence of adverse
selection with a numerical example. To be consistent with the adverse selection
literature, we assume thatZ x
0
F¯2()d 
Z x
0
G¯()d 
Z x
0
F¯1()d
for all x  0 with EG[] = EF1[] = EF2[]. That is, the bank’s belief is a mean
preserving spread of firm 1’s demand, and firm 2’s demand is a mean preserv-
ing spread of the bank’s belief. This ordering implies that both firms have the
same expected demand, but firm 2 has more demand uncertainty. Furthermore,
the bank overestimates firm 1’s risk, and underestimates firm 2’s risk. The use
of mean preserving spread for risk assessment originates from Rothschild and
Stiglitz [73], and is common in the literature (e.g., Stiglitz and Weiss [77]).
Recall that the bank optimizes the interest rate based on its belief G. For any
given , including C(p; c; s; ; b; ¯m;G), cost of borrowing is relatively high for
firm 1, which has less risky demand prospects, compared to firm 2, which has
more risky demand prospects. As a result, owner 1might choose to create a pure
equity firm, whereas firm 2 might be financed with pure debt or debt-equity
mix. Figure 1.4 illustrates this well known adverse selection problem. Figure
1.4(a) shows the bank’s interest rate optimization problem. The participation
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constraint is binding, and C = 0:21 maximizes the bank’s expected profits un-
der G. Figure 1.4(b) shows the bank’s true expected profit as a function of the
interest rate. C is too high for firm 1. Hence, only firm 2 borrows when  = 

C,
and the bank’s expected profit is 3.79. This example illustrates the danger of in-
terest rate optimization under information asymmetry. Namely, the bank loses
the opportunity to lend to firm 1 because it sets the interest rate too high. Our
example is well aligned with the existing adverse selection literature. For exam-
ple, Stiglitz and Weiss [77] present a similar result; please see Figure 3 on page
397 in their paper.
A government intervention can help the bank increase its profits. This result
arises because a government mandate that forces the bank to charge less than
C can mitigate adverse selection by increasing the quality of borrowers. For
instance, in the example we present in Figure 1.4(b), if the government forced
the bank to charge nomore than 15%, then the bank would charge 15% and both
firms would borrow. As a result, the bank’s expected profits would be equal
to 11.24, which is higher than its expected profits at  = C. Settings similar
to this example are used in macroeconomics to justify government control on
lending terms, e.g., Ordover andWeiss [68] andMankiw [59]. Such government
practices are also supported by the data we present in Section 1.1.
Stiglitz andWeiss [77] also show that credit is rationed at equilibrium. In this
example, the credit limit serves as a credit rationing mechanism. It is binding
for firm 1 if   18% and for firm 2 if   28%. In the next section, we show that
interest rate optimization in the absence of a credit limit can have disastrous
consequences and that imposing a credit limit mitigates those consequences by
preventing over-borrowing.
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Figure 1.4: The bank’s interest rate optimization with and without a credit limit.
There are two firms in the economy. Firm 1’s demand is Weibull with mean
1 = 100 and parameters k1 = 2 and 1 = 1= (1 + 1=k1). Firm 2’s demand is
Weibull with mean 2 = 100 and parameters k2 = 1 and 2 = 2= (1 + 1=k2).
The bank believes that both firms have Weibull demand with mean B = 100
and parameters kB = 1:5 and B = B= (1 + 1=kB). p = 2:5, c = 1, ¯m = 0:12,
 = 0, and b = s = 0. Figures (a) and (b) show the bank’s interest rate optimiza-
tion and adverse selection under a credit limit, respectively. In Figure (a), if the
bank imposes a credit limit, C = 0:21 is optimal under G. Figure (b) shows
adverse selection under a credit limit by showing the bank’s expected profits
under Fi2f1;2g as a function of the interest rate. Firm 1 borrows if   18%. Firm 2
borrows if   28%. Figures (c) and (d) show the bank’s interest rate optimiza-
tion and adverse selection without a credit limit, respectively. In Figure (c), if
the bank does not impose a credit limit, U = 0:27 is optimal underG. Figure (d)
shows adverse selection in the absence of a credit limit by showing the bank’s
expected profits under Fi2f1;2g. Firm 1 borrows if   19:5%. Firm 2 borrows if
  47:3%.
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1.6.4 Adverse Selection without A Credit Limit
Interest rate optimization in the absence of a credit limit also suffers from ad-
verse selection. Moreover, an additional complication arises because the bank
does not have a credit allocation device to ration credit. Figures 1.4(c) and 1.4(d)
show the pitfall of this lending mechanism with a numerical example. We gen-
erate Figures 1.4(c) and 1.4(d) with the parameter values we used to generate
Figures 1.4(a) and 1.4(b). Figure 1.4(c) shows the bank’s interest rate optimiza-
tion problem. The participation constraint is binding, and U = 0:27 maximizes
the bank’s expected profits under G. Figure 1.4(d) shows the bank’s true ex-
pected profit as a function of the interest rate. Once again, U is too high firm
1. Hence, only firm 2 borrows when  = U , and the bank’s profit is -11.70. The
bank loses money in expectation because it cannot prevent firm 2 from over-
borrowing. A government regulation that forces the bank to lend at a lower
interest rate amplifies over-borrowing. For example, if the bank is forced to
charge less than 15%, then it charges 15% with the belief that its expected profit
will be equal to 1.03. Both firms borrow at  = 0:15. At  = 0:15, the true ex-
pected profits from firm 1 and firm 2 are 8.38 and -22.82, respectively. Hence,
the bank’s total expected profit under Fi2f1;2g is -14.44. Once again, this result
arises because firm 2 borrows excessively, and plays a risk free gamble with the
bank’s money.
Comparing the true expected profits with and without a credit limit illus-
trates the benefit of imposing a credit limit. Figure 1.4(d) shows that the bank
loses money in expectation if   41:7%. Put differently, for any given inter-
est rate that is below 41.7%, the bank’s true expected profit with a credit limit
is higher than its true expected profit in the absence of a credit limit. For ex-
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ample, at  = 15%, the bank’s true expected profits with and without a credit
limit are 11.24 and -14.44, respectively. Hence, imposing a credit limit mitigates
adverse selection regardless of whether interest rates are optimized or exoge-
nously determined, whereas using the interest rate as a single instrument can
lead to excessive losses.
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CHAPTER 2
BALANCING GROWTH AND BANKRUPTCY RISK FOR A CASH
CONSTRAINED FIRM
2.1 Introduction
How fast should a firm grow? On the one hand, a company that moves slowly
misses profitable investment opportunities. It is eventually outperformed by
competitors. On the other hand, a company that tries to grow too fast can run
into cash flow problems that lead to bankruptcy. But how slow is too slow,
and how fast is too fast? Finding the right answer to this question is crucial to
maximizing the long term profits of a firm.
The J. Peterman Co., founded in 1987 as a catalog retailer, is an example
of growing too fast. Mr. John Peterman, the founder and first owner of the J.
Peterman Co., had initial success in catalog retailing. However, when venture
capital firms provided funds for the company, they pressured him to set unreal-
istic sales targets. An aggressive growth strategy was the only option to achieve
these targets in a short time frame. In an effort to grow fast, the company’s cash
flows got out of control, which led to Chapter 11 bankruptcy in 1999 (Peterman
[70]).
Ingres, a data analytics company, has the opposite story. Ingres’ main com-
petitor was Oracle in the early 80s. Both companies were small back then. Or-
acle targeted to grow at a 100% per year rate while Ingres chose a decent but a
relatively slower growth target of 50% (Moore [63]). According to Moore, exec-
utives at Ingres felt that “[Ingres] simply cannot grow any faster than 50 percent
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and still adequately serve customers. No one can. Look at Oracle. They are
promising anything and everything and shipping little or nothing... Their cus-
tomers hate them. They are going to hit the wall.” Some 30 years later, Oracle’s
sales revenue has reached $35 billion. According to the latest press kit, Ingres’
sales revenue was $68 million in 2008.
These examples illustrate the relationship between growth and the associ-
ated risks. A slow growth company avoids risky decisions. Although such a
strategy ensures short-term survival, it leads to tiny financial returns. On the
other hand, aggressive growth requires making risky investment decisions. If
these decisions are successful, then the firm grows at an outstanding pace. Oth-
erwise, the firm fails to survive. Hence, an aggressive growth strategy implies
high risk and high return, whereas a conservative growth strategy leads to low
risk and low return.
In this chapter, we study the tradeoff between growth and bankruptcy risk.
We analyze this tradeoff by setting up a finite horizon cash-constrained inven-
tory model with non-stationary demand. In our model, the firm seeks to max-
imize its expected ending cash position, discounted at a constant rate. This or
a similar target (e.g., maximizing the firm’s sales or net worth) is a common
objective in practice because most investors (e.g., venture capital firms) seek to
exit with a high return on their investment in a short time horizon (e.g., five
years). A non-stationary demand stream, which is a function of the firm’s past
sales, captures demand growth. In addition, a cash constrained setting captures
risk because a cash constrained firm may need to borrow to achieve its growth
potential.
Our primary objective is to identify an optimal or close to optimal inventory
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ordering policy for a cash constrained firm. Analyzing an ordering policy re-
veals the corresponding growth trajectory in our model because the ordering
decision is the only operational decision that the firm makes. We first analyze
a best case scenario in which the firm can achieve growth without running into
cash flow problems. We show the optimality of a modified newsvendor solution
that captures the impact of today’s order quantity on future demand. Then we
introduce financial constraints, and prohibit the firm to borrow with risk. This
setting allows us to replicate a self-financing growth trajectory.
After analyzing the above cases, we introduce bankruptcy risk by allowing
the firm to borrow from a perfectly competitive lending market. We study both
reorganization and liquidation bankruptcies to understand the impact of legal
restrictions on the firm’s operational and financial decisions. We first focus on
a reorganization bankruptcy scenario in which the firm can restructure without
any penalties every time it fails to meet its debt obligations. This scenario rep-
resents the most favorable bankruptcy case for the firm because it allows the
firm to erase its outstanding debt and restart its operations without incurring
bankruptcy costs. Our analysis shows that the modified newsvendor solution
we obtain under the best case scenario with unconstrained growth is also opti-
mal in this scenario. Hence, we provide an operations management perspective
on the benefit of reorganization bankruptcy for entrepreneurial growth. Then
we switch our attention to liquidation bankruptcy by studying a stopping time
problem in which the firm stops its operations when it fails to meet its debt obli-
gations for the first time. This scenario represents the least favorable bankruptcy
case for the firm owner (i.e., the entrepreneur) because she loses her initial in-
vestment entirely. Although no closed form solution exists for the optimal order
quantity under liquidation bankruptcy, we propose a heuristic solution that bal-
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ances the tradeoff between growth and risk. We also perform numerical analysis
to show that this heuristic performs well. Figure 2.1 outlines the scenarios we
study in this chapter.
Figure 2.1: Different growth scenarios. Unconstrained growth corresponds to
the best case scenario in which the firm has sufficient cash to finance its inven-
tory investment. It is a specific instance of constrained growth, which corre-
sponds to financing growth with internal cash flows. Reorganization and liq-
uidation bankruptcy scenarios capture the impact of bankruptcy risk when the
firm can use external financing by borrowing from a risk neutral financial mar-
ket.
Growth
Without Bankruptcy Risk With Bankruptcy Risk
Unconstrained Constrained Reorganization Liquidation
Our analysis reveals several managerial insights. First, the optimal order
quantity of an unconstrained firm exceeds the classical single-period newsven-
dor solution. That is, when demand is a function of the firm’s past actions,
the firm overinvests to fuel growth. Second, comparing the firm’s expected
ending cash positions under the unconstrained and the constrained cases with-
out bankruptcy risk indicates that internal cash flow constraints (i.e., a self-
financing growth strategy) can significantly depress firm growth. Third, our
analysis indicates that the firm can achieve a higher expected ending cash po-
sition by borrowing with risk, regardless of whether it is reorganized or liq-
uidated in the event of a bankruptcy. Put differently, growth requires making
risky investment decisions. Comparing the firm’s expected ending cash posi-
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tions under liquidation and reorganization bankruptcies shows that the firm
can perform better under reorganization bankruptcy. This is not surprising be-
cause reorganization bankruptcy gives the firm more leeway to follow a more
aggressive growth strategy.
Combining these observations indicates that our model captures the tradeoff
between growth and risk. That is, we show that a firm that follows a conserva-
tive growth strategy by choosing small order quantities realizes limited growth
(e.g., Ingres) whereas a firm that follows a more aggressive growth strategy by
choosing large order quantities declares bankruptcy on sample paths with low
demand realizations (e.g., The J. Peterman Co.) and enjoys significant growth
on sample paths with high demand realizations (e.g., Oracle). Lastly, we nu-
merically examine the probability of bankruptcy, and show that it is higher in
the early periods. This result arises because the firm is more likely to face cash
flow problems in the early periods due to a combination of low demand and
high order quantities. This observation is consistent with practice because most
of the firm failures occur in the early stages (Chava and Jarrow [21]).
2.2 Literature Review
Managing growth in the presence of cash flow constraints has received atten-
tion in the finance, economics, and strategic management literatures. Empirical
evidence indicates that most small firms finance their growth through internal
financing (i.e., retained earnings), and, as a result, a small firm’s growth is con-
strained by its ability to generate cash (Carpenter and Petersen [19] and refer-
ences therein). One of the simplest and most intuitive models that ties a firm’s
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operational characteristics to its growth prospects is the self-financing growth
(SFG) model. This model analyzes the firm’s working capital needs and operat-
ing expenses as well as its ability to generate profits through sales to compute
the maximum SFG rate that can be achieved through internally generated cash
flows (e.g., Churchill and Mullins [23]). The SFG model highlights the impor-
tance of operations by predicting that an operationally efficient firm can grow
faster than an inefficient firm because of its ability to achieve a higher return
on investment. However, it relies on very strong assumptions (e.g., no random-
ness in sales, the firm’s past performance is an accurate predictor of its future)
to reach this conclusion. We generalize the SFG model in Section 2.3 by formal-
izing the firm’s operational decisions through a multi-period inventory model
with random demand.
The firm can relax its internal cash flow constraints by borrowing from finan-
cial markets. In fact, Aghion et al. [1] empirically show that access to financial
markets enhances firm growth. However, borrowing introduces bankruptcy
risk because the firm might fail to repay its debt. From a theoretical stand-
point, there are multiple ways to model growth when the firm faces bankruptcy
risk. One way is to adopt a mathematical finance approach and assume that
the firm’s revenues or cash flows follow a Brownian motion. In this approach,
the firm declares bankruptcy when its cash reserves hit zero for the first time.
Hence, bankruptcy is modeled as a barrier option. For example, Radner and
Shepp [71] analyze a firm that seeks to maximize the discounted sum of its ex-
pected dividends by selecting a dividend policy and picking a drift-volatility
pair from a finite action set, which represents different operational strategies.
They characterize the optimal dividend policy, which involves paying no divi-
dends if the cash reserve is less than a threshold and paying out all the excess
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cash if the cash reserve exceeds the same threshold, and show that if the firm
follows the optimal policy, it goes bankrupt in a finite amount of timewith prob-
ability one. See Dutta and Radner [31] and Caldentey and Haugh [16] and refer-
ences therein for other papers that use similar settings to model the relationship
between a firm’s real (i.e., operational) and financial activities.
Another way to model growth and bankruptcy risk is to assume that there
is information asymmetry between the firm and its lenders regarding the firm’s
investment prospects and/or actions. This assumption leads to borrowing con-
straints because the lender wants to prevent over-borrowing. The economics
literature adopting this framework focuses on the impact of lending contracts
and agency issues on a firm’s growth prospects and bankruptcy risk (Clementi
and Hopenhayn [24] and references therein). Despite providing financial pre-
dictions that are consistent with empirical evidence regarding growth and
bankruptcy risk, both the mathematical finance approach and the asymmetric
information approach lead to limited operational insights due to their highly
stylized operational investment models. In contrast, the firm in our model bor-
rows from a perfectly competitive lending market to finance its inventory in-
vestment. This setting provides an operations management framework to ana-
lyze the relationship between growth and bankruptcy risk.
In the operations management literature, operational decisions under finan-
cial constraints and bankruptcy risk have receivedmore attention lately. Among
single-periodmodels, Xu and Birge [82], Buzacott and Zhang [15], Dada andHu
[26], and Alan and Gaur [2] analyze a single firm’s interactions with financial
markets under different modeling assumptions. Similarly, Lai et al. [50], Kou-
velis and Zhang [47], and Yang and Birge [84] study the interactions between
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supply chain partners in the presence of financial considerations, such as con-
tracting and trade credit. Multi-period inventory models incorporate additional
financial dynamics, such as cash flows constraints, wipeout and reorganization
bankruptcies, dividend payments, and capital subscriptions, e.g., Li et al. [56],
Hu and Sobel [42], Chao et al. [20], and Hu et al. [43]. Financial constraints and
bankruptcy risk also affect the firm’s survival strategy (Archibald et al. [6]) and
its relations with its supply chain partners (Swinney and Netessine [79], Babich
[8]), the choice of production technologies (Lederer and Singhal [53], Boyabatli
and Toktay [13]), the optimal time to shut down a firm (Xu and Birge [83]), and
the optimal time to offer an IPO (Babich and Sobel [9]). Our work contributes to
this stream by modeling the operational and financial decisions of a firm facing
a growing demand stream, which is a function of its past actions.
Ourwork is also related to the capacitymanagement literature, part of which
deals with capacity expansion to satisfy growing demand. See Van Mieghem
[81] for a critical review of this literature. Lastly, our growth model is also sim-
ilar to the new-product diffusion models under supply constraints (e.g., Ho et
al. [41], and Kumar and Swaminathan [49]). We contribute to these two streams
by studying the impact of financial constraints and bankruptcy risk on a firm’s
growth strategy. We capture the firm’s growth prospects with a single parame-
ter, which makes our model relatively more tractable.
2.3 Growth without Bankruptcy Risk
We analyze operational and financial decisions of a firm that faces random
demand. The firm is managed by the owner who seeks to maximize the dis-
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counted value of her firm’s expected ending cash position in a T -period prob-
lem. In this section, the owner avoids making risky financial decisions to ensure
that her company survives even in the worst demand realizations. This setting
allows us to study the implications of a self-financing growth strategy.1
It is conventional to index time by the number of periods left. For instance,
period t implies that the firm has t more periods to go. The firm has xt  0
available as its starting capital. It orders Qt units by paying cQt to its supplier,
where c denotes the per unit cost. If xt > cQt, the firm puts its excess cash,
xt   cQt, into the financial market to generate an interest revenue at a risk free
rate r f . If xt < cQt, then the firm borrows cQt   xt to pay the supplier. It owes
(1+r f )(cQt xt), i.e., loan plus interest, to the financial market at the end of period
t. If the firm borrows, Qt should be sufficiently small such that the firm can repay
(1 + r f )(cQt   xt) with probability one (i.e., regardless of the realized demand
in period t). After the firm purchases Qt units, a random demand Dt occurs.
The firm generates a revenue of pminfQt;Dtg + s(Qt   Dt)+, where p denotes the
selling price, s denotes the salvage value of unsold units, and x+ = maxfx; 0g.
The firm salvages unsold units at the end of the period. Hence, it does not
carry inventory from one period to the next. Carrying inventory makes the
bankruptcy process and pricing risk more complicated, but does not change the
main tradeoff between growth and bankruptcy risk.
The firm starts its operations with a starting cash position of xT  0. Its
ending cash position in period t (i.e., starting cash position in period t   1) can
1In practice, a self-financing growth strategy refers to a growth strategy funded solely by
retained earnings. In ourmodel, we slightlymodify this definition, and allow the firm to borrow
without risk. In our model, borrowing without risk can be interpreted as borrowing from a
suppler, i.e., trade credit.
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be written as
xt 1 = (1 + r f )(xt   cQt) + pminfQt;Dtg + s(Qt   Dt)+ for t 2 f1;    ;T g:
In this formulation, xt   cQt represents the firm’s excess cash or outstanding
debt. DT = T where T is a random variable. For t < T , we assume that the
firm’s demand Dt has the following form:
Dt = minfQt+1;Dt+1g + t: (2.1)
Here   0 is a scalar, which captures the firm’s growth prospects. Following
(2.1), demand in period t, Dt, is a function of the firm’s growth prospects, the
past demand realizations T ;    ; t+1 and the past order quantities QT ;    ;Qt+1.
This setting allows us to capture path dependence, where a high order quantity
in period t stochastically increases demand in the subsequent periods. In (2.1),
the first component, minfQt+1;Dt+1g, is a deterministic function sales in period
t + 1. Let yt = minfQt+1;Dt+1g and qt = Qt   yt. Then, sales in period t can be
written as
minfQt;Dtg = minfyt + qt; minfQt+1;Dt+1g + tg
= minfyt + qt; yt + tg
= yt +minfqt; tg: (2.2)
Observe that sales in period t,minfQt;Dtg, decomposes into two components.
The first component, yt, can be interpreted as the baseline demand that the firm
builds in periods T;    ; t + 1. This component is deterministic at the beginning
of period t. The second component, minfqt; tg is random. From an inventory
perspective, yt and qt can be interpreted as orders placed to satisfy the deter-
ministic and the stochastic components of demand, respectively. The stochastic
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component of demand t is non-negative and follows a continuous probability
distribution. t   are i.i.d. across time. The pdf, cdf, complementary cdf (ccdf),
and inverse ccdf of the demand distribution are denoted as f , F, F¯, and F¯ 1, re-
spectively. Let  = 1=(1 + r f ) denote the discount rate, and let p¯ = p and s¯ = s.
Using Qt = yt + qt and (2.2), we can write xt 1 as
xt 1 = (1 + r f )(xt   cQt) + pminfQt;Dtg + s(Qt   Dt)+
= (1 + r f )[xt + ( p¯   c)yt + ( p¯   s¯)minfqt; tg   (c   s¯)qt]
This formula allows us to write the firm’s ending cash position as a function
of its starting cash position xt, baseline demand yt, and a newsvendor type sales
revenue formula ( p¯  s¯)minfqt; tg  (c  s¯)qt with i.i.d. random demand t  0. Let
yT  0 denote the firm’s starting baseline demand. Then the baseline demand at
the end of period t 2 f1;    ;T g can be written recursively as
yt 1 = minfQt;Dtg
= (yt +minfqt; tg);
where the second line follows from (2.2).
Recall that the firm avoids making financially risky decisions. Also observe
that the firm knows yt before making its ordering decision. The firm has no
bankruptcy risk if xt 1  0 even when t = 0. Setting t = 0 in (2.3) shows that
the firm has no bankruptcy risk if
qt  xt + ( p¯   c)ytc   s¯ : (2.3)
This constraint limits the order quantity, and ensures that the firm can borrow at
a risk free rate because the firm repays loan plus interest in full with probability
one.
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The firm’s objective is to choose its order quantities (qT ;    ; q1) to maximize
the discounted value of its expected ending cash position. This problem can
be formulated as a dynamic program. Let Ct (qtjxt; yt) denote the discounted ex-
pected terminal wealth when the firm orders qt in period t and the optimal order
quantity in the subsequent periods. Here, the superscript C denotes constrained
growth. t is a function of the state variables xt and yt and the decision variable
qt. Similarly, let VCt (xt; yt) denote the maximum discounted expected terminal
wealth when the firm has t periods to go. In the last period, the firm seeks to
maximize its discounted expected ending cash position subject to the cash flow
constraint. That is,
VC1 (x1; y1)  max C1 (q1jx1; y1)  
Z 1
0
x0 f (1)d1
s.t. x0 = (1 + r f )[x1 + ( p¯   c)y1 + ( p¯   s¯)minfq1; 1g   (c   s¯)q1]
0  q1  x1 + ( p¯   c)y1c   s¯ :
For t > 1,
VCt (xt; yt)  max Ct (qtjxt; yt)  
Z 1
0
VCt 1(xt 1; yt 1) f (t)dt
s.t. xt 1 = (1 + r f )[xt + ( p¯   c)yt + ( p¯   s¯)minfqt; tg   (c   s¯)qt]
yt 1 = (yt +minfqt; tg)
0  qt  xt + ( p¯   c)ytc   s¯ : (2.4)
The first two constraints track the state variables. The cash flow constraint
(2.4) ensures that the firm avoids making risky investment decisions. We first
show two technical results that will be useful to characterize the optimal or-
dering policy. Then we analyze the best case scenario in which the firm has
sufficient cash in each period so that the cash flow constraints are never bind-
ing.
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Lemma 2.3.1 For any period t, VCt (x; y) increases in x for a fixed y, and increases in y
for a fixed x.
Proof is omitted, and follows from the fact that both variables expand the con-
straint set.
Lemma 2.3.2 Ct (qjx; y) is jointly concave in (x; y; q), and VCt (x; y) is jointly concave in
(x; y).
Proof: The objective function is the last period is
C1 (qjx; y) =
Z 1
0
x0 f (1)d1
= x + ( p¯   c)y + ( p¯   s¯)
Z q
0
F¯(1)d1   (c   s¯)q;
which is jointly concave in (x; y; q). Hence, VC1 (x; y) is jointly concave in (x; y) be-
cause the constraint set is convex. Next we show that VCt (x; y) is jointly concave
in (x; y) for t  2. Suppose VCt 1(x; y) is jointly concave in (x; y) by induction. We
first show that VCt 1((1+ r f )[x+ ( p¯  c)y+ ( p¯  s¯)minfq; tg  (c  s¯)q]; (v+minfq; tg))
is jointly concave in (x; y; q). Let  2 [0; 1] and ¯ = 1   . For any (x; y; q)
and (x¯; y¯; q¯), let ¯¯x = x + ¯x¯, ¯¯y = y + ¯y¯, and ¯¯q = q + ¯q¯. Furthermore let
qˆ = minfq; tg + ¯minfq¯; tg. Then
VCt 1

(1 + r f )[ ¯¯x + (p¯   s¯)¯¯y + ( p¯   s¯)minf ¯¯q; tg   (c   s¯) ¯¯q]; (¯¯y +minf ¯¯q; tg)

 VCt 1

(1 + r f )[ ¯¯x + ( p¯   s¯)¯¯y + ( p¯   s¯)qˆ   (c   s¯) ¯¯q]; (¯¯y +minf ¯¯q; tg)

 VCt 1

(1 + r f )( ¯¯x   c( ¯¯q + ¯¯y)) + p ¯¯y + (p   s)qˆ + s ¯¯q; (¯¯y + qˆ)

 VCt 1

(1 + r f )[x + ( p¯   s¯)y + (p¯   s¯)minfq; tg + sq]; (y +minfq; tg)

+¯VCt 1

(1 + r f )[x¯ + ( p¯   s¯)y¯ + ( p¯   s¯) minfq¯; tg + sq¯]; (y¯ +minfq¯; tg)

:
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The first inequality follows because minf ¯¯q; tg  qˆ and VCt 1(x; y) is an increasing
function of x. The second inequality follows because VCt 1(x; y) is an increasing
function of y. The last inequality follows because VCt 1(x; y) is jointly concave in
(x; y). Hence, VCt 1((1+ r f )[x+ (p¯  c)y+ ( p¯  s¯)minfq; tg   (c  s¯)q]; (y+minfq; tg))
is jointly concave in (x; y; q). Consequently, Ct (qjx; y) = E[VCt 1((1 + r f )[x + ( p¯  
c)y+ (p¯  s¯)minfq; tg   (c  s¯)q]; (v+minfq; tg))] is also jointly concave in (x; y; q).
Then
VCt (x; y) = max
0q x+( p¯ c)yc s¯
Ct (qjx; y)
is jointly concave in (x; y) since the constraint set is convex. 
2.3.1 Unconstrained Growth
Suppose (xt; yt) are sufficiently high such that the cash flow constraint does not
bind at the optimal solution. The optimal solution of this problem reveals the
firm’s unconstrained growth trajectory. The next proposition formalizes this
argument. This policy will serve as a benchmark for our subsequent analysis
because it allows the firm to achieve growth without running into cash flow
problems.
Proposition 2.3.1 Let
Nt(q) 
0BBBBB@c   s¯ + ( p¯   c) t 1X
i=0
¯i
1CCCCCA Z q
0
F¯(t)dt   (c   s¯)q;
where ¯ = . Furthermore, let
qUt  F¯ 1
 
c   s¯
c   s¯ + ( p¯   c)Pt 1i=0 ¯i
!
: (2.5)
If
xt + ( p¯   c)
t 1X
i=0
¯iyt  (c   s¯)
tX
i=1
t iqUi (2.6)
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then the optimal order quantity that is used to satisfy the random component of demand
in period t is equal to qUt , and the corresponding value function is
VCt (xt; yt)  xt + ( p¯   c)
t 1X
i=0
¯ jyt +
tX
l=1
t lNl

qUl

for t 2 f1; : : : ; T g:
Proof: Proof is by induction. In the last period, the firm solves
VC1 (x1; y1) = max x1 + ( p¯   c)y1 + ( p¯   s¯)
Z q1
0
F¯(1)d1   (c   s¯)q1
s.t 0  q1  x1 + ( p¯   c)y1c   s¯ :
qU1 = F¯
 1  c s¯
p¯ s¯

maximizes the objective function in the absence of the constraint.
Hence, if x1+(p¯ c)y1c s¯  qU1 , we have VC1 (x1; y1) = x1 + ( p¯   c)y1 + N1

qU1

. Suppose
the formula holds in period t   1. In period t, suppose xt + ( p¯   c)Pt 1i=0 ¯iyt 
(c   s¯)Pti=1 t iqUi . If the firm orders qUt , we have
xt 1 + ( p¯   c)
t 2X
i=0
¯iyt 1 = (1 + r f )[xt + ( p¯   c)yt + (p¯   s¯)minfqUt ; tg   (c   s¯)qUt ]
+(p¯   c)
t 2X
i=0
¯i
h
(yt +minfqUt ; tg)
i
 (1 + r f )[xt + ( p¯   c)yt   (c   s¯)qUt ] + ( p¯   c)
t 2X
i=0
¯iyt
= (1 + r f )
2666664xt + ( p¯   c) t 1X
i=0
¯iyt   (c   s¯)qUt
3777775
 (1 + r f )
2666664(c   s¯) tX
i=1
t iqUi   (c   s¯)qUt
3777775
= (c   s¯)
t 1X
i=1
t i 1qUi :
The first inequality follows because the worst demand realization is equal to
zero. The second inequality follows from (2.6). Hence, if (2.6) holds in period t
and the firm orders qUt then we know that (2.6) will also hold in period t   1. By
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induction,
Ct

qUt jxt; yt

= 
Z 1
0
VCt 1(xt 1; yt 1) f (t)dt
= 
Z 1
0
0BBBBB@xt 1 + ( p¯   c) t 2X
i=0
¯ jyt 1 +
t 1X
l=1
t l 1Nl

qUl
1CCCCCA f (t)dt:
Using the definitions of xt 1 and yt 1, we can rewrite Ct

qUt jxt; yt

as
Ct

qUt jxt; yt

= 
Z 1
0
0BBBBB@xt 1 + ( p¯   c) t 2X
i=0
¯iyt 1 +
t 1X
l=1
t l 1Nl

qUl
1CCCCCA f (t)dt
= xt + (p¯   c)
t 1X
i=0
¯iyt +
0BBBBB@c   s¯ + (p¯   c) t 1X
i=0
¯i
1CCCCCA Z qUt
0
F¯(t)dt
 (c   s¯)qUt +
t 1X
l=1
t lNl

qUl

= xt + (p¯   c)
t 1X
i=0
¯iyt +
tX
l=1
t lNl

qUl

:
Furthermore, the second line indicates that @
C
t
@qt
jqt=qUt = 0. Hence, qUt is the optimal
order quantity because t is concave in q by Lemma 2.3.2. 
Observe that the objective function decomposes into T separate single-
period inventory problems when the cash flow constraints are non-binding. If
 = 0 then the optimal order quantity in period t is equal to F¯

c s¯
p¯ s¯

, which is
the classical newsvendor solution. However, the order placed in period t has
an impact on future demand when  > 0. This impact leads to the modified
newsvendor solution, qUt , which is greater than the classical newsvendor solution.
That is, the firm orders more than the classical newsvendor solution when the
order quantity has a positive impact on future demand.
The firm’s total order quantity in period t is
QUt =
8>>>><>>>>:
qUT if t = T;
minfQUt+1;Dt+1g + qUt if t < T:
(2.7)
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QUt defines the firm’s unconstrained growth trajectory. It can also be interpreted
as the self-financing growth trajectory because the firm either does not borrow
or borrows a minimal amount that is always repaid.
At the beginning of the time horizon, QUt values are random variables for
t 2 f1;    ; T   1g because they depend on past demand realizations, T ;    ; t+1.
For planning purposes, the firm can compute various performance measures
related to QUt . For example it can compute the expected order quantities ET [QUt ],
where the subscript T denotes the firm’s information set at the beginning of
the time horizon. Other moments of QUt can also be computed to assess the
uncertainty associated with the firm’s unconstrained growth trajectory. Figure
2.2 shows the expected order quantities as a function of the length of the time
horizon T and the growth coefficient . T determines the magnitude of the
firm’s growth prospects. For example, in Figure 2.2(a), T = 10 allows the firm
to have significantly higher order quantities compared to T = 5.  determines
the nature of the firm’s growth trajectory. For example,  > 1 implies monotone
growth, whereas  < 1 captures slow growth with eventual decline.
Despite its simplicity, our demand model can capture a wide variety of
growth trajectories. If one is interested in modeling more complicated growth
trajectories (e.g., a convex increasing expected order quantity followed by an
eventual decline), s/he can do so by making the growth coefficients and/or
demand variables time specific. For our purposes, a combination of a time in-
variant  value and identically distributed demand shocks are sufficient. Hence,
we confine our attention to this scenario in the rest the chapter.
Proposition 2.3.1 also defines the necessary conditions to achieve the max-
imum growth with self-financing. Namely, (2.6) implies that the firm should
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Figure 2.2: The expected order quantity ET [QUt ] for various scenarios. t are i.i.d.
log-normal with f (t) = 1

p
22
exp

  (ln  )222

, where E[] = 33:12 =
p
Var[] =
33:12. p = 2, c = 1, s = 0:2,  = 0:95. In Figure (a), we compute the expected order
quantities for three different problems with T = 5; 7; 10. The growth coefficient
 = 1:2. Figure (b) is identical to (a) except  = 0:6.
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have a high starting capital and/or a strong baseline demand to be able to afford
ordering themodified newsvendor quantities. Startingwith a large (xT ; yT ) com-
bination is one way to ensure unconstrained growth. However, a firm that starts
its operations with cash flow constraints might also reach the unconstrained
regime through a combination of the optimal order quantities and a sequence
of high demand realizations. In the next subsection, we characterize the optimal
ordering policy under the presence of cash flow constraints.
2.3.2 Constrained Growth
Let qCt (x; y) denote the optimal order quantity of the constrained problem. It
is relatively easy to compute qCt because Ct (qjx; y) is concave in q. Figure 2.3
shows the optimal order quantity as a function of the firm’s starting cash posi-
tion and baseline demand. For any fixed baseline demand value, the optimal
order quantity increases in the starting cash position. Similarly, it increases in
the baseline demand for a given starting cash position. Observe that the optimal
order quantity increases linearly for small values of x and y. That is, the credit
limit is binding, and qCt (x; y) =
x+( p¯ c)y
c s¯ when x and y are relatively small. As x
or y becomes large, the cash flow constraint becomes non-binding. That is, the
optimal order quantity satisfies the first order condition, @
C
t
@q = 0. Although the
optimal order quantity equals the unconstrained solution, qUt , when (2.6) holds,
there exists (x; y) values such that the constraint is non-binding, and the opti-
mal solution is less that qUt . In those instances, the firm prefers to conserve cash
rather than maxing out its credit limit to order qUt .
Another implication of Figure 2.3 is that a cash constrained firm with a very
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Figure 2.3: The cash constrained optimal order quantity in period 2, qC2 , as a
function of x2 and y2. T = 2 and i2f1;2g is exponential with mean 100. p = 5,
c = 1, s = 0:2 r f = 0:05, and  = 0:25. The unconstrained order quantity qU2
is equal to 191.01. We vary the starting cash position x2 between 0 and 360 for
three baseline demand values; y2 = 1, y2 = 10, and y2 = 25. The optimal order
quantity is equal to the cash flow constraint x2+( p¯ c)y2c s¯ for small values of x2 and
y2. For relatively large values of x2 and y2, the credit constraint is not binding,
and the optimal order quantity satisfies the first order condition @
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low (xt; yt) value enters a vicious cycle because it can only order a small amount,
which leads to tiny profits. As a result, (xt 1; yt 1) is also low, and the firm grows
at a very slow pace. One alternative for the firm to break such a vicious cy-
cle is to borrow a relatively large amount (i.e., order more than x+( p¯ c)yc s¯ ), which
introduces bankruptcy risk. We analyze risky borrowing in the next section.
2.4 Growth with Bankruptcy Risk
In the previous section, we imposed a constraint on the firm’s order quantity
to ensure that its ending cash position is non-negative even when the realized
demand equals zero. In this section, we remove this constraint, which intro-
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duces bankruptcy risk. As a consequence, the risk neutral lending market sets
the lending interest rate to price the firm’s bankruptcy risk. Let t denotes the
lending interest rate. Then the firm’s ending cash position in period t can be
written as
xt 1 = (1+r f )[xt c(yt+qt)]++pyt+(p s) minfqt; tg+sqt (1+t)[c(yt+qt) xt]+: (2.8)
This formula implies that if c(yt + qt)  xt then the firm does not borrow, and
puts its excess cash into the financial market to generate an interest revenue at
the risk free rate r f . If c(yt + qt) > xt then the firm borrows, and the risk neutral
financial market sets the lending interest rate t to earn the risk free rate r f in
expectation. Let zt(qt; tjxt; yt) denote the threshold demand value below which
the firm’s ending cash position is negative. Setting minfqt; tg = zt(qt; tjxt; yt) in
(2.8) and rearranging terms show that
zt(qt; tjxt; yt) =
 
[(1 + t)c   s]qt   [p   (1 + t)c]yt   (1 + t)xt
p   s
!+
: (2.9)
If the firm borrows and the realized demand exceeds zt then the bank re-
ceives the loan plus interest (1 + t)[c(qt + yt)   xt] in full. If the realized demand
is less than zt then the firm does not have sufficient cash to repay the loan plus
interest. As a result, the bank only receives pyt + (p   s)t + sqt. The bank deter-
mines the lending interest rate using the following formula.
Lemma 2.4.1 If qt  xt+(p¯ c)ytc s¯ , then the firm has no bankruptcy risk (NBR) in period t,
and t = r f . If qt >
xt+(p¯ c)yt
c s¯ , then the firm borrows with risk (BWR), and t is set such
that Z zt(qt ;t jxt ;yt)
0
F¯(t)dt =
(c   s¯)qt   (p¯   c)yt   xt
p¯   s¯ : (2.10)
Proof: t must be equal to r f when the firm has no bankruptcy risk because
the firm repays the loan plus interest in full. As we discussed in the previous
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section, the firm has no bankruptcy risk if qt  xt+(p¯ c)ytc s¯ . If the firm orders qt >
xt+(p¯ c)yt
c s¯ then the lender receives
minfpyt + (p   s)t + sqt; (1 + t)[c(yt + qt)   xt]g:
Hence, the bank’s expected return is
E[minfpyt + (p   s)t + sqt; (1 + t)[c(qt + yt)   xt]g]
c(qt + yt)   xt   1:
Setting it equal to r f and rearranging terms give (2.10). 
We shall drop the arguments of zt(qt; tjxt; yt) for notational convenience. Ob-
serve that if the firm borrows with risk then
xt 1 = (1 + t)xt + [p   (1 + t)c]yt + (p   s)minfqt; tg   [(1 + t)c   s]qt
= (p   s)
 
minfqt; tg   [(1 + t)c   s]qt   [p   (1 + t)c]yt   (1 + t)xtp   s
!
= (p   s) (minfqt; tg   zt) :
The last line follows from (2.9) because zt > 0 when the firm borrows with risk.
Hence, the firm’s ending cash position can be written as
xt 1 =
8>>>><>>>>:
(1 + r f )[xt + (p¯   c)yt + ( p¯   s¯)minfqt; tg   (c   s¯)qt] if qt  xt+(p¯ c)ytc s¯ ;
(p   s) (minfqt; tg   zt) if qt > xt+(p¯ c)ytc s¯ :
Observe that xt 1 above is identical to (2.3) when the firm has no bankruptcy
risk. When the firm borrows with risk, it earns (loses) p   s for every unit of
demand that is above (below) the bankruptcy threshold zt.
What happens if the ending cash position falls below zero? A negative end-
ing cash position implies that the firm cannot meet its debt obligations. In prac-
tice, a firm that cannot meet its debt obligations can file for either a Chapter 7
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or a Chapter 11 bankruptcy. Under Chapter 7 bankruptcy, it liquidates its assets
and stops operating. Under Chapter 11 bankruptcy, it reorganizes itself and
continues to operate. Of course, bankruptcy in practice is a complicated proce-
dure with many stake holders and legal claimants. In the rest of this section, we
will explore two extreme forms of bankruptcy in terms of their financial implica-
tions for the owner. First, we will analyze a Chapter 11 bankruptcy in which the
firm restructures its operations without losing its customer base. In our model,
the firm’s remaining debt to the bank is erased, and it continues to operate with
zero starting cash in the following period. The bank takes this possibility into
account while setting the lending interest rate using (2.10). Hence, it is not an
unfair scenario from the bank’s perspective. Then we will analyze a Chapter 7
bankruptcy in which the firm stops its operations in the first period in which
its ending cash position falls below zero. In practice, debt holders and some-
times equity holders receive some additional payments due to the liquidation
of the firm’s assets or the sales of the firm’s intangible assets (in our model the
firm’s baseline demand can be interpreted as its market share). However, we
omit these additional benefits for simplicity. By studying these two extremes,
we analyze the best and the worst case scenarios for the owner in case of a
bankruptcy.
2.4.1 Reorganization Bankruptcy
In this section, we analyze a scenario in which the firm can continue to oper-
ate after declaring bankruptcy. In this scenario, the firm declares bankruptcy
when its cash position falls below zero. After declaring bankruptcy, the firm’s
outstanding debt is erased, and it is allowed to have a fresh restart without los-
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ing its baseline demand. We show the optimality of the modified newsvendor
policy we presented in Proposition 2.3.1. That is, the firm solves T separate
modified newsvendor problems. This result has the following interpretation:
if a bankrupt firm is allowed to resume its operations without any penalties, it
will make its operational decisions as if it were solving an unconstrained growth
problem. We first present the dynamic programming formulation of this prob-
lem. In the last period, the firm solves
VR1 (x1; y1)  maxq10 
R
1 (q1jx1; y1)  
Z 1
0
maxfx0; 0g f (1)d1
s.t. x0 = (1 + r f )[x+1   c(y1 + q1)]+ + py1 + (p   s)minfq1; 1g
+sq1   (1 + 1)[c(y1 + q1)   x+1 ]+Z z1
0
F¯(1)d1 
(c   s¯)q1   (p¯   c)y1   x+1
p¯   s¯
1  r f
z1 =
 
[(1 + 1)c   s]q1   [p   (1 + 1)c]y1   (1 + 1)x+1
p   s
!+
:
In periods fT; : : : ; 2g, the firm solves
VRt (xt; yt) = maxqt0
Rt (qtjxt; yt)  
Z 1
0
VRt 1 (xt 1; yt 1) f (t)dt
s.t xt 1 = (1 + r f )

x+t   c(qt + yt)
+
+ pyt + (p   s)minfqt; tg
+sqt   (1 + t) c(qt + yt)   x+t +
yt 1 =  (yt +minfqt; tg)Z zt
0
F¯(t)dt  (c   s¯)qt + ( p¯   c)yt   x
+
t
p¯   s¯ (2.11)
t  r f (2.12)
zt =
 
[(1 + t)c   s]qt   [p   (1 + t)c]yt   (1 + t)x+t
p   s
!+
:
Observe that the state variable xt appears as x+t in the optimization model be-
cause if the firm’s starting cash position is negative then it declares bankruptcy
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and restarts its operations with zero cash. If the firm has bankruptcy risk, (2.11)
becomes binding. Otherwise, (2.12) is binding, and the lending interest rate
equals r f . The following result will be useful to characterize the optimal policy.
Lemma 2.4.2 If the firm borrows with risk in period t, then
E[maxfxt 1; 0g] = (p   s)
Z 1
zt
(minfqt; tg   zt) f (t)dt
= (1 + r f )
"
x+t + (p¯   c)yt + ( p¯   s¯)
Z qt
0
F¯(t)dt   (c   s¯)qt
#
:
Proof: Recall from our definition of reorganization bankruptcy that if xt is neg-
ative then the firm starts period t with zero cash. Hence, the firm’s starting cash
position is x+t . If qt >
x+t +(p¯ c)yt
c s¯ (i.e., if the firm borrows with risk) then its ending
cash position is non-negative only when t  zt. Hence,
E[maxfxt 1; 0g] = (p   s)
Z 1
zt
(minfqt; tg   zt) f (t)dt:
Borrowing with risk implies that zt(qt; tjx+t ; yt) > 0. As a result, t is determined
by (2.10). Then
E[x+t 1] = (p   s)
Z 1
zt
(minfqt; tg   zt) f (t)dt
= (p   s)
Z 1
0
(minfqt; tg  minfzt; tg) f (t)dt
= (p   s)
 Z qt
0
F¯(t)dt  
Z zt
0
F¯(t)dt
!
= (p   s)
 Z qt
0
F¯t(t)dt   (c   s¯)qt   ( p¯   c)yt   x
+
t
p¯   s¯
!
= (1 + r f )
"
x+t + ( p¯   c)yt + ( p¯   s¯)
Z qt
0
F¯t(t)dt   (c   s¯)qt
#
:
The penultimate line follows from (2.10). 
The next proposition shows that the optimal order quantity that is used to
satisfy the random component of demand is equal to qUt .
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Proposition 2.4.1 The optimal order quantity in period t, qRt (xt; yt), is equal to qUt =
F¯ 1

c s¯
(p¯ s¯)+(p¯ c)Pt 1i=1 ¯i

. Furthermore,
VRt (xt; yt) = x
+
t + (p¯   c)
t 1X
j=0
¯ jyt +
tX
l=1
t lNl

qUl

for t 2 f1; : : : ; T g and xt 2 R:
Proof: In the last period, if the firm chooses an order quantity that requires
borrowing with risk (BWR), the objective function becomes
R1 (q1jx1; y1; BWR) = E[maxfx0; 0g]
= x+1 + ( p¯   c)y1 + (p¯   s¯)
Z q1
0
F¯(1)d1   (c   s¯)q1: (2.13)
The second line follows from Lemma 2.4.2. If the firm chooses an order quantity
that does not require borrowing with risk (NBR), the objective function is
R1 (q1jx1; y1;NBR) = E[maxfx0; 0g]
= E[(1 + r f )[x+1   c(y1 + q1)] + py1 + pminfq1; 1g + sq1]
= R1 (q1jx1; y1; BWR);
where the second line follows from setting 1 = r f in (2.11). Therefore, the objec-
tive functions under (BWR) and (NBR) are identical. qR(x1; y1) = qU1 = F¯
 1  c s¯
p¯ s¯

maximizes this objective function. Hence,
VR1 (x1; y1) = x
+
1 + ( p¯   c)y1 + N1(qU1 ):
Now suppose the value function formula holds in period t 1. Further, suppose
the firm chooses an order quantity that requires borrowing with risk. Then
Rt (qtjxt; yt; BWR) = Rt (qtjx+t ; yt; BWR)
= 
Z 1
zt
VRt 1 (xt 1; yt 1) f (t)dt + 
Z zt
0
VRt 1(0; yt 1) f (t)dt
= 
Z 1
zt
0BBBBBB@xt 1 + ( p¯   c) t 2X
j=0
¯ jyt 1 +
t 1X
l=1
t l 1Nl

qUl
1CCCCCCA f (t)dt
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+
Z zt
0
0BBBBBB@( p¯   c) t 2X
j=0
¯ jyt 1 +
t 1X
l=1
t l 1Nl

qUl
1CCCCCCA f (t)dt
= 
Z 1
zt
((p   s) (minfqt; tg   zt)) f (t)dt
+( p¯   c)
t 2X
j=0
¯ j
Z 1
0
((yt +minfqt; tg) f (t)dt
+
t 1X
l=1
t lNl

qUl

:
The fourth equality follows from Lemma (2.4.2). Rearranging terms gives
Rt (qtjxt; yt; BWR) = x+t + ( p¯   c)yt + ( p¯   s¯)
Z qt
0
F¯(t)dt   (c   s¯)qt
+( p¯   c)
t 1X
j=1
¯ j
 
yt +
Z qt
0
F¯(t)dt
!
+
t 1X
l=1
t lNl

qUl

= x+t + ( p¯   c)
t 1X
j=0
¯ jyt +
0BBBBBB@ p¯   s¯ + (p¯   c) t 1X
j=1
¯ j
1CCCCCCA Z qt
0
F¯(t)dt
 (c   s¯)qt +
t 1X
l=1
t lNl

qUl

= x+t + ( p¯   c)
t 1X
j=0
¯ jyt + Nt(qt) +
t 1X
l=1
t lNl

qUl

:
Following the same steps to derive the objective function under no borrowing
with risk leads to the same expression. Hence,
Rt (qtjxt; yt) = x+t + ( p¯   c)
t 1X
j=0
¯ jyt + Nt(qt) +
t 1X
l=1
t lNl

qUl

:
qUt maximizes Rt (qtjxt; yt), regardless of how the procurement of qUt is financed.
As a result,
VRt (xt; yt) = x
+
t + ( p¯   c)
t 1X
j=0
¯ jyt +
tX
l=1
t lNl

qUl

for all xt and t 2 f1; : : : ; T g . 
Intuitively, if the firm borrows from a risk neutral lending market under re-
organization bankruptcy, its bankruptcy risk in each period measured by the,
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probability of bankruptcy F

zt(qUt ; tjx+t ; yt)

, is appropriately priced. Combin-
ing this result with a reorganization bankruptcy setting that erases the firm’s
debt obligations in case of a bankruptcy decomposes the firm’s objective func-
tion into T separate problems. As a result of this decomposition, the modified
newsvendor solution we derive under the unconstrained growth scenario, qUt ,
becomes optimal.
This result shows that a well functioning financial system (i.e., a risk neutral
lending market that drives the lender’s expected profits to the risk free rate) and
a reorganization bankruptcy mechanism that protects the firm in the event of a
bankruptcy by erasing its debt without damaging its baseline demand enable
the firm to reach its maximum growth potential. In reality, financial markets
are not perfectly competitive and a reorganization bankruptcy involves costs,
so VRT (xT ; yT ) can be interpreted as the most optimistic estimate of the owner’s
expected ending cash position.
Let Pt(qUt jx; y) denote the probability of declaring bankruptcy at the end
of period t under reorganization bankruptcy. The optimality of the modified
newsvendor solution allows us to capture the tradeoff between growth and
bankruptcy risk.
Lemma 2.4.3 For a given (x; y), Pt(qUt jx; y) increases in the firm’s growth prospects
measured by .
Proof: The firm orders qUt in period t. If qUt  x
++(p¯ c)y
c s¯ then the xt 1  0 with
probability one. Hence, the firm has no bankruptcy risk. If qUt >
x++(p¯ c)y
c s¯ then
the firm borrows with risk, and (2.10) holds. Differentiating (2.10) with respect
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to qt gives  
@zt
@qt
+
 
@zt
@t
!
@t
@qt
!
F¯(zt) =
c   s¯
p¯   s¯ : (2.14)
Furthermore, Pt(qUt jx; y) = Pr

t < zt(qUt ; tjx; y)

= F(zt). Therefore,
@Pt
@
=
@qUt
@
 
@zt
@qt
+
 
@zt
@t
!
@t
@qt
! 
qt=qUt
f

zt(qUt ; tjx; y)

 0
because

@zt
@qt
+

@zt
@t

@t
@qt
 
qt=qUt
 0 by (2.14) and qUt increases in . 
This result implies that a high growth coefficient induces the firm to order
more, but a higher order quantity requires more borrowing, which increases the
probability of bankruptcy.
2.4.2 Liquidation Bankruptcy
Liquidation bankruptcy complicates the problem because the firm stops its op-
erations when its ending cash position falls below zero. This problem can be for-
mulated as a dynamic program with a stopping time. Let Lt (qtjxt; yt) denote the
discounted expected terminal wealth period in t as a function of the state vari-
ables xt and yt and the action variable qt under liquidation bankruptcy. Similarly,
let VLt (xt; yt) and qLt (xt; yt) denote the corresponding maximum expected terminal
wealth and the optimal order quantity in period t, respectively. Observe that the
bankruptcy threshold demand zt is identical to the previous section. We have
the boundary condition VLt (xt; yt) = 0 for all xt < 0 and t 2 f1; : : : ; T g. That is,
qLt (xt; yt) = 0 for xt < 0. In the last period, if x1  0,
VL1 (x1; y1)  maxq10 
L
1(q1jx1; y1)  
Z 1
z1
x0 f (1)d1
s.t. x0 = (1 + r f )[x1   c(v1 + q1)]+ + py1 + (p   s)minfq1; 1g
+sq1   (1 + 1)[c(y1 + q1)   x1]+
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Z z1
0
F¯(1)d1  (c   s¯)q1   ( p¯   c)y1   x1p¯   s¯
1  r f
z1 =
 
[(1 + t)c   s]q1   [p   (1 + 1)c]y1   (1 + 1)x1
p   s
!+
:
For t > 1 and xt  0,
VLt (xt; yt)  maxqt0 
L
t (qtjxt; yt)  
Z 1
zt
VLt 1(xt 1; vt 1) f (t)dt
s.t. xt 1 = (1 + r f )[xt   c(yt + qt)]+ + pyt + (p   s)minfqt; tg
+sqt   (1 + t)[c(yt + qt)   xt]+
yt 1 =  (yt +minfqt; tg)Z zt
0
F¯(t)dt  (c   s¯)qt   (p¯   c)yt   xtp¯   s¯
t  r f
zt =
 
[(1 + t)c   s]qt   [p   (1 + t)c]yt   (1 + t)xt
p   s
!+
:
We first analyze a single period problem. If x1  0, the firm seeks to maxi-
mize E[maxfx0; 0g] by choosing an order quantity. The next lemma shows that
the optimal order quantity in a single period problem is equal to qU1 if x1  0.
Lemma 2.4.4 If x1  0, the optimal order quantity is qL1(x1; y1) = qU1 = F¯ 1

c s¯
p¯ s¯

.
Furthermore, VL1 (x1; y1) = 0 if x1 < 0, and
VL1 (x1; y1) = x1 + ( p¯   c)y1 + ( p¯   s¯)
R qU1
0
F¯(1)d1   (c   s¯)qU1
otherwise.
Proof: If x1 < 0, then the firm is bankrupt which implies that it cannot place
an order and that the value function is zero by the boundary condition. Sup-
pose x1  0, the problem formulation of a single period problem is identical
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to the one we presented under reorganization bankruptcy. Hence, the classical
newsvendor solution is optimal. 
This result implies that the optimal order quantity in a single period prob-
lem is independent of the starting capital as long as the firm is not bankrupt
at the beginning of the period. This separability result arises due to the risk
neutral lending market, which allows us to derive the equality presented in
Lemma 2.4.2. However, it no longer holds in a multi-period setting even un-
der a risk neutral lending market. Analyzing a two-period problem illustrates
the complexity that arises due to the stopping time. The objective function in a
two-period problem can be written as L2(q2jx2; y2) = 
R 1
0
VL1 (x1; y1) f (2)d2. If the
firm does not have bankruptcy risk, then x1  0 by definition. If q2 > x2+(p¯ c)y2c s¯ ,
then the firm has bankruptcy risk in period 2. As a result,
L2(q2jx2; y2; BWR) = 
Z 1
0
V1(x1; y1) f (2)d2
= 
Z 1
z2
V1(x1; y1) f (2)d2
= 
Z 1
z2
V1((p   s)(minfq2; 2g   z2); (y2 +minfq2; 2g)) f (2)d2:
The second line follows because x1 < 0 for 2 < d2, which implies thatR z2
0
V1(x1; y1) f (2)d2 = 0. Using Lemma 2.4.4, we can write
L2(q2jx2; y2; BWR) = 
Z 1
z2
V1((p   s)(minfq2; 2g   z2); (y2 +minfq2; 2g)) f (2)d2
= (p   s)
Z 1
z2
(minfq2; 2)   z2) f (2)d2
+
Z 1
z2
(( p¯   c)(y2 +minfq2; 2g) + N1(qU1 )) f (2)d2
= x2 + (p¯   c)y2 + (p¯   s¯)
Z q2
0
F¯(2)d2   (c   s¯)q2|                                                           {z                                                           }
Period 2
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+ 
Z 1
z2
(( p¯   c)(y2 +minfq2; 2g) + N1(qU1 )) f (2)d2|                                                               {z                                                               }
Period 1
:(2.15)
The last line follows from Lemma 2.4.2. When the firm has no bankruptcy
risk, the same formula holds with z2 = 0. (2.15) has two parts. The first part,
x2+ ( p¯  c)y2+ (p¯  s¯)
R q2
0
F¯2(2)d2  (c  s¯)q2, is a scalar (i.e., x2+ ( p¯  c)y2) plus the
classical newsvendor function. Hence, following a myopic policy would lead
to the classical newsvendor solution, qU1 . However, q2 also affects the second
part of the profit function, 
R 1
z2
(( p¯  c)(y2 +minfq2; 2g)+N1(qU1 )) f (2)d2. On the
one hand, q2 has a positive impact on this part because the expression inside the
integral increases in q2 for  > 0. That is, a high order quantity fuels growth. On
the other hand, increasing q2 increases z2, which indicates a higher probability of
bankruptcy. Hence, the second part of the profit function is not well behaved.
As a consequence, the objective function under liquidation bankruptcy is not
concave or quasi-concave. Figure 2.4 illustrates these dynamics with a numeri-
cal example.
In general, qt has a direct impact on the firm’s sales revenues in period t.
In addition, it affects the firm’s future cash flows and bankruptcy risk because
zt, xt 1, and yt 1 also depend on qt. Characterizing the optimal order quantity
under liquidation bankruptcy is difficult due to the non-concave nature of the
objective function. However, our analysis so far indicates that the firm’s order
quantity should achieve the right balance between growth and bankruptcy risk.
The next lemma will be useful to propose a simple heuristic that allows the firm
to maintain this balance.
Lemma 2.4.5 For t 2 fT;    ; 2g,
a) VCt (x; y)  VLt (x; y)  VRt (x; y) for all (x; y).
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Figure 2.4: The discounted expected ending cash position L2(q2jx2; y2) as a func-
tion of q2. x2 = 1 and y2 = 1. t2f1;2g is log-normal with E[t] = e10 andp
Var(t) = e10
p
e16   1.  = 0:25, p = 2, c = 1, s = 0:2, and r f = 0:1. The
profit function in period 1 increases in q2 when q2  x2+(p¯ c)y2c s¯ = 2:22 because the
firm has no bankruptcy risk (i.e., z2 = 0). When q2 > 2:22, it might increase or
decrease because both z2 and minfq2; 2g increase in q2. The period 2 component
of the profit function is a scalar plus the classical newsvendor function, which is
maximized at qU1 = 7:39. Adding these two functions leads to a non-monotone
profit function. The optimal order quantity qL2(x2; y2) = 10:12, which is less than
the unconstrained order quantity qU2 = 12:34.
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b) If x  0 and x + ( p¯   c)Pt 1i=0 ¯iy  (c   s¯)Pti=1 t iqUi for i 2 ft;    ; 2g, then
qLi (x; y) = q
U
i for i 2 ft;    ; 1g is an optimal policy under liquidation bankruptcy
and VCt (x; y) = VLt (x; y) = VRt (x; y).
c) Let t(x; y)  VRt (x; y) VCt (x; y). t(x; y) decreases in x for a given y, and decreases
in y for a given x.
Proof: Observe that qCt (x; y), which avoids risky borrowing, is feasible under liq-
uidation bankruptcy. Furthermore, if the firm follows qCt (x; y) under liquidation
bankruptcy, its expected ending cash position will be VCt (x; y), which implies
that VCt (x; y)  VLt (x; y) because the optimal policy under liquidation bankruptcy,
by definition, performs at least as good as qCt (x; y). Similarly, ordering qLt (x; y)
is feasible under reorganization bankruptcy. Following qLt (x; y) under reorgani-
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zation bankruptcy leads to VLt (x; y), which implies that VLt (x; y)  VRt (x; y). This
completes the first part of the proof.
Proposition 2.3.1 shows that qCi (x; y) = q
U
i for i 2 ft;    ; 1g when x  0 and
x+( p¯ c)Pt 1i=0 ¯iy  (c  s¯)Pti=1 t iqUi . Furthermore, comparing the value functions
in Propositions 2.3.1 and 2.4.1 shows that VCt (x; y) = VRt (x; y). Hence, part a)
implies that VCt (x; y) = VLt (x; y) = VRt (x; y), and qCt (x; y) is an optimal policy when
x  0 and x + ( p¯   c)Pt 1i=0 ¯iy  (c   s¯)Pti=1 t iqUi .
Lemmas 2.3.1 and 2.3.2 shows that VCt (x; y) is increasing and jointly concave
in (x; y). Furthermore, VRt (x; y) is linear in x and y, and VRt (x; y) = VCt (x; y) for large
(x; y). Hence, t(x; y) decreases in x for a given y, and decreases in y for a given x
because both functions increase in x and y, but VCt (x; y) increases at a faster rate.

Intuitively, the value functions of the cash constrained scenario and the re-
organization bankruptcy scenario lead to a lower and an upper bound for the
value function of the liquidation bankruptcy scenario, respectively. Further-
more, the gap between the value functions of the reorganization scenario and
the cash constrained scenario becomes smaller as the starting cash position
or the baseline demand increases. In fact, the two values functions are equal
when the firm has enough cash and baseline demand to achieve unconstrained
growth. This result arises because an increase in the starting cash position or the
baseline demand relaxes the internal cash flow constraints. Figure 2.5 illustrates
these dynamics.
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Figure 2.5: The value functions VRT (xT ; yT ), V
C
T (xT ; yT ) and V
L
T (xT ; yT ) as a function
of starting equity xT for yT = 0. T = 5,  = 1:25, p = 5, c = 1, s = 0:2, r f = 0:1.
Demand is log-normal with E[t] =
p
Var(t) = 31:12.
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A Heuristic Solution Under Liquidation Bankruptcy. If executed properly,
borrowing with risk allows the firm to achieve a higher expected ending posi-
tion compared to avoiding risky borrowing. That is, following qCt (x; y) under liq-
uidation bankruptcy would be too conservative because it overlooks the benefit
of risky borrowing. On the contrary, following qRt under liquidation bankruptcy
would be too aggressive because qRt omits the firm’s current state (x; y) and its
bankruptcy risk. Therefore, qCt (x; y) and qRt can be interpreted as two extreme
policies. A linear combination of these two policies leads to a simple heuristic,
qHt (x; y). Namely, let
qHt (x; y)  wtqCt (x; y) + (1   wt)qRt ;
for t  2 and x  0, where wt 2 [0; 1]. Here wt and 1  wt can be interpreted as the
weights that the firm puts on conservative and aggressive growth, respectively.
We propose five alternatives to choose wt.
 Heuristic 1: Set wt = 1, which mimics a conservative growth policy.
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 Heuristic 2: Set wt = 0, which mimics an aggressive growth policy.
 Heuristic 3: Set wt = 0:5, which takes a simple average of qCt (x; y) and qRt to
balance the tradeoff between growth and risk.
 Heuristic 4: Set wt = Pt(qUt jx; y). This heuristic policy takes the bankruptcy
probability under reorganization bankruptcy into account by setting the
weight of qRt equal to the probability of surviving at the end of period t
after ordering qRt under reorganization bankruptcy. A high Pt(qUt jx; y) leads
to a higher weight on qCt (x; y), which lowers the firm’s risk exposure.
 Heuristic 5: Set wt = V
C
t (x;y)
VCt (x;y)+V
R
t (x;y)
. This heuristic sets the weights according
to the value functions of the conservative growth and the reorganization
bankruptcy scenarios. Lemma 2.4.5 implies that the firm puts more weight
on qRt when (x; y) is small.
In addition to the optimal order quantities of the conservative growth,
growth under liquidation bankruptcy, and growth under reorganization
bankruptcy scenarios, Figure 2.6 shows the heuristic solution 0:5qCt (x; y) + (1  
0:5)qRt as a function of the firm’s starting cash position. Intuitively, one would
expect Heuristics 3, 4 and 5 to achieve higher expected ending cash positions
under liquidation bankruptcy than Heuristics 1 and 2 (i.e., qCt (x; y) and qRt ) be-
cause 3, 4 and 5 should provide better approximations for qLt (x; y) by balancing
the tradeoff between growth and risk. In the next section, we perform numerical
experiments to demonstrate the validity of this intuition.
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Figure 2.6: The optimal order quantities qCt (xt; yt), qLt (xt; yt), qRt , and the heuristic
solution for the liquidation bankruptcy case, qHt (xt; yt) = 0:5qCt (xt; yt) + 0:5qRt , as a
function of starting equity xt for yt = 0 in periods t 2 f2;    ; 5g. T = 5,  = 1:25,
p = 5, c = 1, s = 0:2, r f = 0:1. Demand is log-normal with E[t] =
p
Var(t) =
31:12.
0 20 40 60 80
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
Period 2
Starting Equity
O
rd
er
 Q
ua
nt
itie
s
Cash Constrained
Liquidation Bankruptcy
Reorganization Bankruptcy
Heuristic Solution (w=0.5)
0 50 100 150
0
20
40
60
80
Period 3
Starting Equity
O
rd
er
 Q
ua
nt
itie
s
Cash Constrained
Liquidation Bankruptcy
Reorganization Bankruptcy
Heuristic Solution (w=0.5)
0 50 100 150 200
0
20
40
60
80
10
0
Period 4
Starting Equity
O
rd
er
 Q
ua
nt
itie
s
Cash Constrained
Liquidation Bankruptcy
Reorganization Bankruptcy
Heuristic Solution (w=0.5)
0 50 100 150 200 250 300
0
20
40
60
80
10
0
12
0
Period 5
Starting Equity
O
rd
er
 Q
ua
nt
itie
s
Cash Constrained
Liquidation Bankruptcy
Reorganization Bankruptcy
Heuristic Solution (w=0.5)
2.5 Numerical Analysis
Our main objectives in this section are to measure the impact of model param-
eters on the value functions under the conservative growth, growth with liqui-
dation bankruptcy and growth with reorganization bankruptcy scenarios and
to evaluate the performance of the five heuristics proposed in the previous sec-
tion in solving the firm’s problem under liquidation bankruptcy. We also take a
deeper look at the evolution of the firm’s bankruptcy risk over time, and show
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that the firm is more likely to fail in the early periods, regardless of the policy
used. Lastly, we present a simple decision theoretic framework to capture the
tradeoff between growth and bankruptcy risk. Such a framework can be used
to introduce risk aversion to our model.
We define nine different cases with varying model parameters. Table 2.1
shows the parameter values. In each case, we vary one parameter to measure
its impact on the value functions. For example, Cases 1, 2, and 3 capture the
impact of the time horizon. Similarly, Cases 1, 4 and 5 capture the impact of
the firm’s growth prospects, as measured by , whereas Cases 1, 6 and 7 fo-
cus on the impact of demand uncertainty. The coefficient of variation of  (i.e.,p
Var()=E[]) equals 0.5 in Case 6, and equals 2 in Case 7. It is equal to 1 in the
remaining cases. The expected demand, E[t], equals 100 in all cases. Lastly,
Cases 1, 8 and 9 capture the impact of the profit margin. We fix p, c, and vary s
to vary the profit margin, which we define as p¯ cp¯ s¯ .
Table 2.1: Nine different cases and the corresponding value functions. Common
parameters are p = 1, c = 0:8, r f = 0:05, and (xT ; yT ) = (1; 0). Demand is i.i.d.
log-normal for t 2 fT;    ; 1g.
Parameters Value Functions
Case T  E[t]
p
Var(t) s VCT V
L
T V
R
T V
R
T =V
C
T
1 5 0.1 100 100 0.65 15.68 27.69 30.49 1.94
2 3 0.1 100 100 0.65 8.88 17.44 19.18 2.16
3 10 0.1 100 100 0.65 38.13 50.11 54.36 1.43
4 5 0.6 100 100 0.65 27.17 50.96 59.47 2.19
5 5 1.1 100 100 0.65 50.14 105.84 136.56 2.72
6 5 0.1 100 50 0.65 20.27 46.87 48.32 2.38
7 5 0.1 100 200 0.65 10.42 13.17 15.54 1.49
8 5 0.1 100 100 0.60 12.36 25.19 27.98 2.26
9 5 0.1 100 100 0.70 20.97 31.24 34.00 1.62
We first make some simple observations from Table 2.1. The firm’s ex-
pected ending cash position increases in the length of the time horizon, the
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firm’s growth prospects and the profit margin, and decreases in demand un-
certainty, regardless of the scenario (i.e., conservative, liquidation or reorgani-
zation). These observations are intuitive because the firm is likely to sell more
units as T or  increases and makes more money per unit when the profit mar-
gin is high. Lastly, an increase in the demand coefficient of variation increases
the firm’s risk exposure, which decreases its expected ending cash position.
A comparison of the value functions enables us to assess the monetary bene-
fit of being able to borrow with risk under reorganization bankruptcy. One way
to measure such a benefit is to compute the ratio of two value functions. For
example, we find that VRT =V
C
T increases in the firm’s growth prospects, as mea-
sured by . This result shows that the benefit of leverage is more pronounced
for growth firms. It arises because qRt increases in . On the other hand, qCt (xt; yt)
remains constant if the credit limit is binding. As a result, the difference be-
tween qRt and qCt (xt; yt) increases, which leads to an increase in VRT =V
C
T . Similar
inferences can be drawn regarding the relative advantages and drawbacks of
liquidation bankruptcy by computing VLT =V
C
T and V
L
T =V
R
T , respectively.
We rely on various heuristics to solve the firm’s growth problem under liq-
uidation bankruptcy. We first compute the value functions, VCt (x; y), VLt (x; y) and
VRt (x; y), and the corresponding optimal order quantities, qCt (x; y), qLt (x; y) and qRt ,
for t 2 fT;    ; 1g for a given set of parameter values. This step allows us to ob-
tain the five heuristic solutions. Then we generate 2500 sample paths for each
case presented in Table 2.1, and compute the firm’s ending cash position on each
sample path using the optimal policy as well as the five heuristics under liqui-
dation bankruptcy. Table 2.2 illustrates the performance of the optimal solution
in our simulation study. Tables 2.3,...,2.7 show the performance of Heuristics
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1,...,5, respectively.
Table 2.2: Simulation analysis of the optimal discounted expected ending cash
position and the corresponding probability of bankruptcy under the nine cases
presented in Table 2.1. We generate 2500 sample paths, and track the firm’s cash
flow and baseline demand under the optimal policy. Common parameters are
p = 1, c = 0:8, r f = 0:05, and (xT ; yT ) = (1; 0). Please see Table 2.1 for the model
parameters of each case.
Optimal Solution, qLt
Case TE[x+0 ] Pr(x0 < 0)
1 27.55 0.09
2 17.57 0.12
3 50.25 0.05
4 50.64 0.09
5 104.78 0.12
6 47.05 0.02
7 13.12 0.15
8 25.09 0.10
9 31.12 0.06
Table 2.3: Simulation analysis of Heuristic 1 under the nine cases presented in
Table 2.1. Please see Table 2.1 for the model parameters of each case. Table 2.2
presents the details of our simulation study.
Heuristic 1, qCt
Case TE[x+0 ] Pr(x0 < 0) Performance
1 16.89 0.00 61.31%
2 9.08 0.00 51.69%
3 40.45 0.00 80.50%
4 29.01 0.00 57.28%
5 51.33 0.00 48.98%
6 21.04 0.00 44.73%
7 10.57 0.00 80.58%
8 13.12 0.00 52.28%
9 21.86 0.00 70.24%
Our analysis indicates that Heuristics 1 and 2 (i.e., ordering qCt (x; y) and qRt ,
respectively) fail to maintain the balance between growth and bankruptcy risk.
To see this, observe that the probability of bankruptcy under the optimal policy
is always greater than the one under Heuristic 1, which is always equal to zero,
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Table 2.4: Simulation analysis of Heuristic 2 under the nine cases presented in
Table 2.1. Please see Table 2.1 for the model parameters of each case. Table 2.2
presents the details of our simulation study.
Heuristic 2, qRt
Case TE[x+0 ] Pr(x0 < 0) Performance
1 25.05 0.25 90.94%
2 16.78 0.24 95.51%
3 42.28 0.26 84.14%
4 39.64 0.41 78.28%
5 30.80 0.83 29.40%
6 45.85 0.07 97.45%
7 11.96 0.36 91.20%
8 22.95 0.26 91.50%
9 27.71 0.25 89.03%
Table 2.5: Simulation analysis of Heuristic 3 under the nine cases presented in
Table 2.1. Please see Table 2.1 for the model parameters of each case. Table 2.2
presents the details of our simulation study.
Heuristic 3, (qCt + qRt )=2
Case TE[x+0 ] Pr(x0 < 0) Performance
1 27.53 0.06 99.92%
2 17.12 0.05 97.41%
3 50.08 0.06 99.65%
4 50.55 0.12 99.81%
5 97.67 0.30 93.21%
6 44.47 0.00 94.52%
7 13.05 0.19 99.49%
8 24.98 0.07 99.58%
9 31.02 0.05 99.69%
and less than the one under Heuristic 2. That is, qCt (x; y) is too conservative, and
misses profitable growth prospects, whereas qRt is too aggressive, and overlooks
bankruptcy risk. As a result, both heuristics perform relatively poorly. Heuristic
1’s performance varies between 44.73% and 80.50% of the optimal solution in
the nine cases we analyze. Similarly, Heuristic 2’s performance varies between
29.40% and 97.45% of the optimal solution. On the contrary, Heuristics 3, 4 and
5 perform relatively well. For instance, they all achieve more than 95% of the
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Table 2.6: Simulation analysis of Heuristic 4 under the nine cases presented in
Table 2.1. Please see Table 2.1 for the model parameters of each case. Table 2.2
presents the details of our simulation study.
Heuristic 4, qCt + Pr(xt 1  0)(qRt   qCt )
TE[x+0 ] Pr(x0 < 0) Performance
1 26.72 0.17 96.99%
2 17.46 0.15 99.35%
3 46.64 0.16 92.81%
4 49.54 0.17 97.82%
5 91.45 0.19 87.28%
6 46.37 0.05 98.56%
7 12.64 0.29 96.38%
8 24.46 0.18 97.51%
9 29.70 0.17 95.43%
Table 2.7: Simulation analysis of Heuristic 5 under the nine cases presented in
Table 2.1. Please see Table 2.1 for the model parameters of each case. Table 2.2
presents the details of our simulation study.
Heuristic 5, qCt +
VRt
VCt +V
R
t
(qRt   qCt )
Case TE[x+0 ] Pr(x0 < 0) Performance
1 27.38 0.11 99.40%
2 17.52 0.11 99.69%
3 49.70 0.08 98.90%
4 48.04 0.21 94.86%
5 73.79 0.55 70.43%
6 46.45 0.01 98.74%
7 12.98 0.22 98.97%
8 24.84 0.12 99.04%
9 30.76 0.09 98.84%
optimal expected ending cash position in seven out of nine cases. A relatively
high performance of these three heuristics arises due to their ability to balance
the tradeoff between growth and bankruptcy risk. Surprisingly, Heuristic 3,
which takes a simple average of qCt (x; y) and qRt , performs better thanHeuristics 4
and 5 in seven cases. Furthermore, it achieves 97.41% and 94.52% of the optimal
solution in the other two cases.
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Another important aspect of bankruptcy risk is its evolution over time. Fig-
ure 2.7(a) shows the proportion of sample paths in which the firm survives, and
Figure 2.7(b) shows the hazard rate (i.e., the number of sample paths in which
the firm declares bankruptcy in period t divided by the number of sample paths
in which the firm survives at the beginning of period t) in Case 1 under dif-
ferent policies. Both figures illustrate that the firm is more likely to fail in the
early periods, regardless of the policy used. This result arises due to a few rea-
sons. First, the firm needs to make larger new investments (i.e., choose high qt
values) in the early periods to fuel growth. For example, (2.5) shows that qRt de-
creases over time. Second, demand uncertainty measured by the coefficient of
variation of Dt, i.e.,
p
Var(t)=(yt + E[t]), is high in the early periods because the
firm has no or very little baseline demand. Combining large investments and
high demand uncertainty with cash flow constraints puts the firm into financial
distress. If the firm survives through the first few periods, its new investments
and demand uncertainty go down. Furthermore, it accumulates cash and/or
baseline demand. As a result, bankruptcy becomes less likely. Thus, we illus-
trate that bankruptcy risk in our model is driven by new investments, demand
uncertainty, and the firm’s cash position and baseline demand.
Figure 2.8 shows the relationship between the probability of bankruptcy and
the discounted average ending cash position over all sample paths in which the
firm survives, i.e., TE[x0jx0  0]. The main takeaway of Figure 2.8 is that for
a given case, a policy that leads to a high probability of bankruptcy also leads
to a high expected ending cash position given that the firm survives. This ob-
servation is consistent with the anecdotal evidence we present in the introduc-
tion. That is, on average, firms following aggressive growth policies are more
likely to fail (e.g., The J. Peterman Co.) compared to firms following conser-
103
Figure 2.7: The proportion of sample paths in which the firm survives and the
corresponding hazard rate. We analyze Case 1 under the optimal policy and
three heuristic solutions. See Tables 2.1 for the model parameters.
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vative growth policies (e.g., Ingres), but those that follow aggressive growth
policies and survive achieve tremendous success (e.g., Oracle). In this regard,
the final outcome of each policy can mapped into a simple decision tree with
two nodes. The first and the second nodes pay 0 and TE[x0jx0  0] with
probabilities Pr(x0 < 0) and Pr(x0  0), respectively. In this decision theoretic
view of the firm’s problem, a high expected payoff upon survival (i.e., a high
TE[x0jx0  0] value) is associated with a low survival probability, Pr(x0  0).
This approach can be used to formulate the firm’s problem under risk aversion
because the firm can be modeled as an expected utility maximizer seeking to
maximize TE[x+0 ] (or 
TE[x0jx0  0]) minus the probability of bankruptcy times
a bankruptcy cost. Similar utility functions are used in the literature to assess
firm performance under bankruptcy risk (e.g., [78] and references therein).
2.6 Limitations and Future Work
In this chapter, we provide an operations management perspective on the rela-
tionship between growth and bankruptcy risk for a cash constrained firm. Our
analysis shows that in the absence of bankruptcy risk and cash flow constraints,
the firm overinvests (i.e., orders more than the classical single-period newsven-
dor solution) to fuel growth. In addition, comparing the unconstrained and the
constrained growth scenarios without bankruptcy risk indicates that internal
cash flow constraints can significantly depress firm growth. We also show that
the presence of cash flow constraints forces the firm to make financially risky
investment decisions. We present a closed form solution for the firm’s problem
under reorganization bankruptcy, and propose simple heuristics that balance
the tradeoff between growth and bankruptcy risk under liquidation bankruptcy.
105
Figure 2.8: The probability of bankruptcy and the discounted average ending
cash position over all sample paths in which the firm survives (i.e., TE[x0jx0 
0]). We analyze nine different scenarios under six different ordering policies
(i.e., the optimal solution and the five heuristic solutions). Each data point rep-
resents a case-policy pair. See Tables 2.1 and 2.2 for the model parameters of
each scenario and the formulation of each heuristic, respectively.
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Our model has some limitations. First, unlike the mainstream inventory the-
ory models, the firm in our model does not carry inventory from one period
to the next. Although carrying inventory does not lead to any major changes
in the firm’s operational decisions, it complicates the bankruptcy process and
the firm’s interactions with financial markets. Future research may examine the
impact of inventories and other assets on growth and bankruptcy risk. Second,
we focus on maximizing the firm’s expected ending cash position. Other ob-
jectives, such as maximizing the net present value of expected dividends, can
also be considered. Future theoretical research may also examine alternative
lending models and competition among multiple firms. Lastly, future empirical
research may focus on identifying the operational determinants of firm growth.
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CHAPTER 3
EXPLAINING THE PROBABILITY OF BANKRUPTCY USING
INVENTORY TURNOVER
3.1 Introduction
We analyze the relationship between inventory productivity and financial dis-
tress for retailers. There are a few reasons that might lead to a negative rela-
tionship between inventory productivity and financial distress. First, retailers’
working capital needs are driven by their inventory investments because in-
ventory is usually the largest current asset in a retailer’s books. That is, high
inventory productivity means relatively less inventory, which means less work-
ing capital. Second, high inventory productivity leads to a relatively shorter
cash cycle, which implies a faster turnaround from procurement to cash. As
a result, retailers with high inventory productivity are less likely to face cash
flow problems. Lastly, high inventory productivity means lower excess inven-
tory and stock-out risks because retailers with high inventory productivity have
more flexibility to absorb demand shocks.
Quantifying the relationship between inventory productivity and bankruptcy
risk is important from a financial standpoint because incorporating inventory
information into the existing bankruptcy prediction models can improve model
accuracy. As a result, better estimates can be generated regarding the future of
a distressed firm. Quantifying this relationship is also important from an op-
erations management standpoint because the existing inventory models can be
modified to take bankruptcy risk and its financial implications into account.
Financial distress often leads to corporate failures, which have costly con-
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sequences for all stakeholders including owners or shareholders, employees,
creditors, customers, and suppliers. According to a general definition stated in
Dimitras et al. [27], a failure is a situation in which a firm cannot pay lenders,
preferred stock shareholders, suppliers, etc. or it is bankrupt according to the
law. Modeling firm failures, especially bankruptcies, has been widely studied
in accounting, economics and finance since the early 1960s. The majority of the
empirical work in these areas use financial ratios to quantify financial distress.
The ratios that explain financial distress include net income to total assets, total
liabilities to total assets, and working capital to total assets.
While the ratio based bankruptcy prediction models are useful in terms of
providing early warning signals for a potential bankruptcy, they provide very
little insights regarding how to save a distressed firm. That is, they are descrip-
tive, not prescriptive. For example, past research shows that a high ratio of total
liabilities to total assets is a strong bankruptcy predictor. However, recommend-
ing a distressed firm to lower its debt to avoid bankruptcy would be an empty
statement because a high leverage is not the main problem; it is a symptom of
more fundamental problems. Hence, the existing bankruptcy predictionmodels
are more useful to creditors seeking to assess their risk than to managers. Con-
sequently, identifying the root causes of financial distress and taking actions to
eliminate them would be a more fruitful direction from a turnaround manage-
ment standpoint.
One could hypothesize many potential root causes for financial distress such
as cash flow problems, organizational issues, incapable management, compet-
itive pressure, and unsuccessful pricing and marketing strategies. Such a list
also would also include poor operational decisions. In fact, a growing body of
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literature in operations management has focused on the relationship between a
firm’s operational decisions and its bankruptcy risk. Xu and Birge [82], Buza-
cott and Zhang [15], Dada and Hu [26], and Alan and Gaur [2] study a cash con-
strained firm’s interactionswith a lender, and characterize the firm’s operational
and financial decisions at equilibrium. Financial considerations and bankruptcy
risk also affect a firm’s survival strategy (Archibald et al. [6]), capacity invest-
ment decisions (Swinney et al. [78]), choice of production technologies (Lederer
and Singhal [53] and Boyabatli and Toktay [13]), and decisions to offer an IPO
(Babich and Sobel [9]), issue dividends (Hu et al. [43] and references therein),
and shut down (Xu and Birge [83]). Despite these theoretical studies, to the best
of our knowledge, no empirical evidence exists regarding the impact of a firm’s
operational decisions on its bankruptcy risk.
In this chapter, we focus on retail bankruptcies, and test whether inventory
productivity is related to the probability of bankruptcy. Many measures of in-
ventory productivity are used in practice, including inventory turnover, gross
margin return on inventory, and the sales to inventory ratio. We use inventory
turnover as our inventory productivity metric. Our data set contains large re-
tailer bankruptcy filings (i.e., retailers with $100M or more in assets at the time
of bankruptcy) between 1980-2010. Our analysis shows that firms with high
inventory turnover have lower probability of bankruptcy and that adding in-
ventory turnover as an explanatory variable improves the model fit of three
commonly used bankruptcy models. These results are important to illustrate
the relevance of operational efficiency in explaining andmanaging financial dis-
tress.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 provides a lit-
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erature review on the existing bankruptcy prediction models. We develop our
hypothesis in Section 3.3. Sections 3.4 and 3.5 provide details about our data set
and empirical analysis, respectively. Section 3.6 summarizes the limitations of
our model and data set, and outlines future work.
3.2 Literature Review
In this section, we present the commonly used techniques to model and pre-
dict bankruptcies. Altman [4], in a seminal paper on bankruptcy modeling,
proposes discriminant analysis (DA) to identify the most important variables in
detecting bankruptcy risk. In general, DA is used to determine which covariates
discriminate between two or more groups. Since we have two distinct groups
(i.e. bankrupt and non-bankrupt), the analysis can be transformed into a simple
discriminant function of the form zi = Xi, where zi is the z-score for firm i and
Xi is a vector of firm specific covariates. The goal is to estimate  such that every
firm is correctly identified as bankrupt or non-bankrupt based on its z-score. A
cutoff score is computed based on the initial information and the cost of mis-
classification (i.e., identifying a bankrupt firm as non-bankrupt and vice-versa),
and a firm is classified as bankrupt or non-bankrupt based on its z-score and the
cut-off score. Altman [4] uses a sample of 66 manufacturing firms, of which 33
declared bankruptcy during the period 1964-1965, and the remaining 33 firms
were in operation in 1966. The latter 33 firms were chosen on a stratified ran-
dom basis to construct a matched pair sample. The final DA, which is known as
the z-score model, is
z = 1:2xz1 + 1:4x
z
2 + 3:3x
z
3 + 0:6x
z
4 + x
z
5;
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where xz1 := Working Capital / Total Assets, x
z
2 := Retained Earnings / Total
Assets, xz3 := Earnings Before Interest and Taxes / Total Assets, x
z
4 := Market
Value of Equity / Book Value of Debt, and xz5 := Sales / Total Assets. The cut-
off score minimizing the total number of mis-classifications was 2.675. That is,
the original z-score model would classify a firm as bankrupt (healthy) if its z-
score was below (above) 2.675. In the following years, Altman has introduced
alternative (DA) models (e.g., the ZETA score model), which generate better
model fit and more accurate out of sample predictions. Please see Altman and
Hotckiss [5] and references therein for details regarding DA models.
Eisenbass [33] summarizes the pitfalls of DA. DA assumes that the covari-
ates are independent and follow a multivariate normal distribution within each
group. However, financial ratios are highly correlated, and in most cases, co-
variates are right skewed, which make the validity of these assumptions highly
questionable. Dimitras et al. [27] argue that logit/probit models are prefer-
able to DA because they are more flexible in terms of handling various types
of covariates including binary and categorical variables. In the logit model, the
bankruptcy probability for firm i can be written as
Pr(Xi; ) =
1
1 + exp( Xi) :
In terms of classifying firms as bankrupt or non-bankrupt, logarithm of the odds
of the above formula, log

Pr(Xi;)
1 Pr(Xi;)

, corresponds to the z-score of a DA model.
Similar to DA, a cut-off probability that minimizes the type I and type II errors
is determined, and a firm is classified as bankrupt (non-bankrupt) if its proba-
bility of bankruptcy is greater (less) than the cutoff probability. Ohlson [67] uses
a logit model for bankruptcy prediction. He concludes that firm size, financial
structure and performance, and current liquidity are the most important factors
that determine the probability of bankruptcy. Logit/probit models are also used
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by practitioners. For example, Moody’s RiskCalc uses a probit model to gener-
ate expected credit default frequencies for private firms. Although this model
is used to analyze credit worthiness and quality, its results also serve as a proxy
for bankruptcy risk. See Falkenstein et al. [34] for details.
Survival Analysis (SA) is another commonly used technique for bankruptcy
modeling. Kiefer [46] provides the theoretical basis for applying survival anal-
ysis on econometric problems. Shumway [75] shows that single period models
give biased and inconsistent bankruptcy estimates, and uses SA for bankruptcy
modeling. He illustrates the link between survival models and multi-period
logit models. His model includes a combination of accounting ratios and
market-driven variables, and produces more accurate out of sample forecasts
compared to the aforementioned models. He shows that some market driven
variables such as market size, past stock returns and the idiosyncratic stan-
dard deviation of stock returns are statistically significant bankruptcy predic-
tors. Chava and Jarrow [21] extend Shumway [75] by incorporating industry
effects. We provide more details regarding these models in Section 3.5.
Tools originating from mathematical finance are also used in bankruptcy
prediction. For example, Merton [60] introduces an option theoretic framework.
He models the firm’s total asset value as a European call option because equity
holders have limited liability for debt payments in the event of a bankruptcy.
He defines the face value of the firm’s liabilities as the strike price of the call op-
tion, which expires when the debt matures. At the debt maturity date, if assets
are higher than liabilities, then the equity holders exercise their option and their
pay off is what is left after paying debt holders. Otherwise, they let the option
expire. As a result, the firm files for bankruptcy and the payoff to the equity
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holders is zero. Other papers following similar modeling approaches include
Campbell et al. [17], Duffie et al. [30], Duffie [29] and references therein.
The aforementioned models have a common drawback from an operations
management standpoint. They focus on financial ratios and market variables,
which cannot reveal the impact of a firm’s operational characteristics and deci-
sions on its bankruptcy risk. Once the relationship between operational deci-
sions and bankruptcy risk is quantified, it might be possible to construct more
accurate bankruptcy prediction models.
3.3 Motivation
Ideally, we would like to establish a direct link between a retailer’s operational
characteristics and decisions (e.g., inventory management capabilities and or-
der quantities, respectively) and its bankruptcy risk. While establishing such a
relationship is possible in theory, it is not a straightforward task in an empirical
study because most operational decisions are not reported in financial state-
ments. This forces us to find a proxy for a retailer’s operational performance.
Inventory turnover and other related metrics (e.g., sales to inventory ratio) are
commonly used in the literature to study the relationship between a firm’s oper-
ational characteristics and financial performance (Alan et al. [3] and references
therein).
We use inventory turnover as a proxy for a firm’s operational efficiency,
and hypothesize a negative relationship between inventory turnover and
bankruptcy risk. Intuitively, this relationship arises because holding less in-
ventory decreases the possibility of having unsold units, which increases the
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retailer’s inventory turnover. Furthermore, relatively less inventory means less
working capital, faster turnaround from procurement to cash, and more flexi-
bility to absorb demand shocks. As a result, a high inventory turnover retailer’s
financial distress should be minimal. These dynamics lead to our hypothesis:
Hypothesis 3.3.1 Retailers with high inventory turnover have lower probability of
bankruptcy.
We test this hypothesis after describing our data set.
3.4 Data
We use the UCLA-LoPucki Bankruptcy Research Database to test the hypoth-
esis of a negative relationship between inventory turnover and financial dis-
tress. This database includes all those bankruptcy cases filed under Chapter 7
or Chapter 11, in which the firm had assets of $100 million as of the last 10-K
filed prior to bankruptcy. In this database, assets are measured in 1980 dollars.
That is, a bankrupt firm’s assets as of the last 10-K filed prior to bankruptcy are
discounted to 1980 dollars using the Consumer Price Index for All Urban Con-
sumers.1 LoPucki [57] presents the rules defining a bankruptcy case. We use
only a subset of this data set, which includes retail bankruptcies. Furthermore,
we exclude two retail segments, Eating and Drinking Places and Automotive Deal-
ers and Service Stations, because these businesses have more significant service
components than inventory management components. Our data set includes 58
retail bankruptcies filed between 1980 and 2010. Table 3.1 gives a classification
of bankruptcies by their retail segments. Retailers are grouped using the two
digit SIC codes.
1The Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers is available at http://data.bls.gov/cgi-
bin/surveymost?bls
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Table 3.1: Classification of bankruptcy filings based on the two digit SIC codes.
Two Digit Number (%) of
SIC Code Segment Description Bankruptcies
53 General Merchandize Stores 18 (31.03%)
54 Food Stores 10 (17.24%)
56 Apparel and Accessory Stores 9 (15.52%)
57 Furniture and Home Furnishing Stores 8 (13.79%)
59 Miscellaneous Retail 13 (22.41%)
Total 58 (100%)
Figure 3.1 shows the distribution of firm ages at the time of bankruptcy. Fol-
lowing Chava and Jarrow [21], we define firm age as the difference between the
year in which firm declared bankruptcy and the year in which the firm went
public. Figure 3.1 illustrates that most bankruptcies occur in the early years of
a firm’s existence. The average and the median age at the time of bankruptcy
are 10.50 and 14.89, respectively. Table 3.2 presents some recent high profile
bankruptcy cases.
Figure 3.1: Firm age at the time of bankruptcy. Firm age corresponds to the
difference between the year in which the firm declares bankruptcy and the first
year in which the firm is publicly traded.
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Table 3.2: Some high profile bankruptcy filings between 2000 and 2010.
Name SIC Code Filing Date
Kmart Corp. 53 1/22/2002
The Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Company, Inc. 54 12/12/2010
Eddie Bauer Holdings, Inc. 56 6/17/2009
Circuit City Stores, Inc. 57 11/10/2008
WebVan Group, Inc. 59 7/13/2001
We merge the LoPucki database with the Compustat annual database using
CUSIP, which is a unique identification number. The corresponding Compustat
data set includes retailers from two digit SIC codes 53, 54, 56, 57, and 59 that
have $100 million or more measured in 1980 dollars, as of the last 10-K filed.
Our augmented data set has n = 339 retailers. The total number of firm year
observations is 4092.
We lag Compustat data so that they are observable by the market at the be-
ginning of each calendar year. We substitute missing data with the previous
available observation. To be consistent with the literature (e.g., Shumway [75]),
we winsorize2 the accounting data at the 1 and 99 percentiles. Table 3.3 shows
the average and the median inventory values and the average inventory to cur-
rent assets and inventory to total assets ratios in our augmented data set. It
indicates that more than half of a large retailer’s current assets are inventories,
on average.
2Winsorization is a commonly used data transformation technique, which reduces the im-
pact of outliers by setting all outliers equal to a specific percentile of the data. For example, a
98% winsorization sets all data points below the 1st percentile equal to the 1st percentile and all
data points above the 99th percentile equal to the 99th percentile.
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Table 3.3: The average and the median inventory values as well as the average
inventory to current assets (ICA) and the average inventory to total assets (ITA)
ratios. We compute the average and median inventory values over all firm-year
observations (i.e., 4092 data points) after discounting inventories to 1980 dollars
using the Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers.
Average Median Average Average
SIC Code Inventory ($M) Inventory ($M) ICA Ratio ITA Ratio
53 1074 468 63.66% 34.98%
54 514 179 59.77% 22.62%
56 315 158 56.26% 32.45%
57 408 169 59.18% 38.26%
59 447 165 56.89% 35.43%
All Segments 557 193 58.96% 32.42%
3.5 Analysis and Results
3.5.1 Empirical Model
Our model specification is identical to that of Chava and Jarrow [21]. We ob-
serve a total of n = 339 firms at discrete time points t = 1980; 1981;    ; 2010.
Let T = 2010, and let i denote the time of bankruptcy for firm i. Let Nit be an
indicator variable, which is equal to 1 if i  t and 0 otherwise. Furthermore,
let ti denote the first time at which firm i is observed. By definition, ti = 1980
for firms that are actively traded in 1980, and ti > 1980 for firms that enter the
data set after 1980. Similarly, let Ti denote the last period in which firm i is ob-
served. Ti = i  T if the firm declares bankruptcy in i. Ti could also be equal
to T if the firm survives at the end of our study. If a firm remains in the data
set after declaring bankruptcy, we only include the firm year observations up
to (including) the first bankruptcy date in our data set and omit Nit and Xit for
t > i. A firm that leaves the data set without declaring bankruptcy has Nit = 0
for t 2 fti;    ;Tig. Ti < T with i = 1 is also possible if the firm leaves the data set
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without declaring bankruptcy. Such a censoring could occur due to a merger or
an acquisition.
Let Xit denote the time varying covariates of firm i at time t. Discrete time
conditional hazard rate can be defined as
Pit = Pr
 
i = tji  t; Xi;ti ; Xi;ti+1;    ; Xi;Ti

for ti + 1  t  Ti: (3.1)
Chava and Jarrow [21] show that the log-likelihood function corresponding to
(3.1) is equal to
log L(N1;T1 ;    ;Nn;Tn jX1;t1 ;    ; X1;T1 ;    ; Xn;tn ;    ; Xn;Tn)
=
nX
i=1
TiX
t=ti+1
[Nit   Ni;t 1] log
 
Pit
1   Pit
!
+
nX
i=1
TiX
t=ti+1
log (1   Pit)
=
nX
i=1
TiX
t=ti+1
[Nit   Ni;t 1] log(Pit) +
nX
i=1
TiX
t=ti+1
[1   Nit + Ni;t 1] log (1   Pit)
=
nX
i=1
TiX
t=ti+1
Nit log(Pit) + [1   Nit] log (1   Pit) :
The last line follows because Nit Ni;t 1 = 1 only when Nit = 1 since Nit = 1 implies
that Ni;t 1 = 0. This log-likelihood function is identical to the log-likelihood
function of a regression model with binary dependent variables. Following the
standard approach in bankruptcy modeling (e.g., Shumway [75]), we use the
following logistic regression model to estimate the conditioned hazard rates
Pit = 1=
 
1 + exp(Xit)

:
A firm contributes an observation to the regression model for every t 2
fti;    ; Tig. The dependent variable Nit equals one if a bankruptcy filing is
made by firm i in a particular year, zero otherwise. That is, if firm i declares
bankruptcy, then Nit = 0 for t 2 fti;    ; Ti   1g and Ni;Ti = 1.
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3.5.2 Explanatory Variables
In order to show the negative relation between inventory turnover and the
probability of bankruptcy, we estimate the hazard rate with the private firm
model’s, Altman’s [4], and Zmijewski’s [85] variables with and without inven-
tory turnover as an additional explanatory variable. These models are com-
monly used in the literature as a benchmark (e.g., Chava and Jarrow [21]). The
purpose of our approach is to explore whether inventory turnover can increase
the model fit in these three alternative models. The explanatory variables used
in these models are:
 NITA (Net Income / Total Assets): A measure of the firm’s profitability.
Defined as Compustat item [NI] divided by Compustat item [AT]. Firms
with high NITA should have lower probability of bankruptcy. It is an
explanatory variable in the private firm and the Zmijewski models.
 TLTA (Total Liabilities / Total Assets): A measure of the firm’s leverage.
Defined as [LT/AT]. Firmswith high TLTA should have higher probability
of bankruptcy. It is an explanatory variable in the private firm and the
Zmijewski models.
 WCTA (Working Capital / Total Assets): A measure of asset liquidity rel-
ative to total assets. Defined as ([ACT] minus [LCT]) divided by [ACT].
Firms with high WCTA should have lower probability of bankruptcy. It is
an explanatory variable in the Altman model.
 RETA (Retained Earnings / Total Assets): A measure of cumulative prof-
itability of a firm over its entire lifetime relative to total assets. Defined
as [RE/AT]. Firms with high RETA should have lower probability of
bankruptcy. It is an explanatory variable in the Altman model.
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 EBTA (Earnings Before Interest and Taxes / Total Assets): A measure of
the firm’s profitability, excluding taxes and interest income/expense, rel-
ative to total assets. Defined as [EBIT/TA]. Firms with high EBTA should
have lower probability of bankruptcy. It is an explanatory variable in the
Altman model.
 METL (Market Value of Equity / Total Liabilities): According to Altman
and Hotchkiss [5], this variable is a measure that shows how much the
firm’s assets can decline in value before the liabilities exceed the assets
and the firm becomes insolvent. It is similar to option theoretic frame-
work variables originating from Merton [60]. Defined as Common Shares
Oustanding [CSHO] times the Closing Stock Price at the End of the Fis-
cal Year [prcc f] divided by Total Liabilities [LT]. Firms with high METL
should have lower probability of bankruptcy. It is an explanatory variable
in the Altman model.
 SLTA (Sales / Total Assets): Measures the sales generating ability of the
firm’s assets. Defined as [SALE/AT]. Firms with high SLTA should have
lower probability of bankruptcy. It is an explanatory variable in the Alt-
man model.
 CACL (Current Assets / Current Liabilities): Ameasure of the firm’s short
term liquidity. Defined as [ACT/ALT]. Firms with high CACL should
have lower probability of bankruptcy. It is an explanatory variable in the
Zmijewski model.
 LNAGE (Natural logarithm of firm age): A measure of the firm’s maturity.
Defined as the natural logarithm of the difference between the current fis-
cal year and the fiscal year of the first financial statement that is available
in Compustat plus one. (We add one to avoid ln(0) in the first firm-year
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observation.) Some researchers argue that firms with high LNAGE should
have lower probability of bankruptcy. Although it is not an explanatory
variable in the original Altman z-model, it is usually added to the Altman
model, e.g., Chava and Jarrow [21]. It is an explanatory variable in the
Altman and the Zmijewski models we use in our paper.
In addition to these variables, we also use inventory turnover (IT) defined
as Cost of Goods Sold [COGS] divided by the average Inventory [INVT] within
a fiscal year. We use the fiscal year closing value of [COGS] and the average of
the fiscal year opening and the fiscal year closing values of [INVT] to compute
IT.
We present summary statistics for these independent variables in Table 3.4.
Most variables vary in a wide range. For example, the average IT value is 6.61,
but IT varies from a minimum of 1.15 to a maximum of 135.79. Despite this
wide range, more than 98% of all IT values are less than 30. Hence, winsoriza-
tion at the top and bottom 1% leads to a significantly narrower range. Figure
3.2 presents a histogram of inventory turnover values across all 4092 firm-year
observations before winsorization.
3.5.3 Regression Results
In this section, we present the logistic regression results for the private firm,
Altman, and Zmijewski models with and without inventory turnover as an
explanatory variable. The original models, which do not include inventory
turnover as an explanatory variable, provide a sanity check regarding the sta-
tistical significance of previously used explanatory variables in our study, and
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Table 3.4: Summary statistics of the independent variables before winsorization.
Variable Median Mean Min Max Std. Dev.
IT 4.4044 6.6045 1.1533 135.7923 7.7185
WCTA 0.2466 0.2471 -0.1201 0.6189 0.1621
RETA 0.2632 0.2496 -0.6530 0.9004 0.2633
EBTA 0.1026 0.1076 -0.0810 0.3425 0.0754
METL 1.6081 2.9878 0.0505 24.5912 4.0042
SLTA 2.0194 2.2541 0.5158 5.3823 0.9835
NITA 0.0523 0.0487 -0.1975 0.2093 0.0657
TLTA 0.5473 0.5503 0.1271 1.3718 0.1996
CACL 1.8039 2.0774 0.3787 7.5237 1.0909
LNAGE 2.4850 2.4030 0.6931 3.9510 0.8450
Figure 3.2: Histogram of inventory turnover values across all firm-year obser-
vations before winsorization.
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serve as a benchmark to measure the explanatory power of inventory turnover.
In the original private firmmodel, both net income to total assets (NITA) and
total liabilities to total assets (TLTA) are statistically significant with the correct
signs. That is, the conditional hazard rate increases in total liabilities to total
assets, and decreases in net income to total assets. Adding inventory turnover
(IT) as an explanatory variable to the original private firm model increases the
model likelihood from 138.91 to 151.93. This increase is statistically significant
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at p  0:001. Hence, we conclude that adding inventory turnover as an explana-
tory variable increases the model fit. Inventory turnover is statistically signifi-
cant at p  0:01 with the correct sign, indicating that firms with high inventory
turnover have lower probability of bankruptcy. Both net income to total assets
and total liabilities to total assets remain statistically significant after inventory
turnover is added to the model. Please see Table 3.5 for details.
Table 3.5: Logistic regression results with the private firm model variables.
Private Firm Model
Base Model Base Model + IT
Intercept -5.2302*** -4.9652***
(0.4090) (0.4442)
IT -0.1057**
(0.0361)
NITA -15.0577*** -15.0284***
(1.5614) (1.6313)
TLTA 1.5223** 2.0354**
(0.5519) (0.6296)
Model Fit: 138.92*** 151.93***
Likelihood Ratio: 13.02***
Significance codes:    : 0:001,  : 0:01,  : 0:05, :  0:1
In the original Altman model, working capital to total assets (WCTA), re-
tained earnings to total assets (RETA), earnings before interest and taxes to total
assets (EBTA), and market value of equity to total liabilities (METL) are statisti-
cally significant. The probability of bankruptcy decreases in each of these vari-
ables. However, sales to total assets (SLTA) and the natural logarithm of firm
age (LNAGE) have no significance. Insignificance of firm age might arise due
to our sample, which includes large retailers. Put differently, it might be signif-
icant due to mechanical reasons in a sample that includes small firms because
small firms are more likely to fail within the first few years of their existence
(Chava and Jarrow [21]). Adding inventory turnover as an explanatory vari-
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able improves the model fit by increasing the likelihood from 154.84 to 166.36,
which is a significant increase at p  0:001. Inventory turnover has statistical
significance with the correct sign at p  0:01. That is, according to the Altman
model, firms with high inventory turnover have lower bankruptcy risk. While
retained earnings to total assets (RETA), earnings before interest and taxes to
total assets (EBTA), and market value of equity to total liabilities (METL) re-
main statistically significant, working capital to total assets loses its significant
after inventory turnover is added to the model. This might occur due to the
high correlation between inventory and current assets. Please see Table 3.6 for
details.
Table 3.6: Logistic regression results with the Altman model variables.
Altman Model
Base Model Base Model + IT
Intercept -2.2117*** -1.9879**
(0.5842) (0.6091)
IT -0.1251**
(0.0468)
WCTA -0.2895*** -1.4762
(0.8648) (0.9631)
RETA -1.2743* -1.6105**
(0.5944) (0.6252)
EBTA -15.7000*** -15.0134***
(2.5290) (2.5331)
METL -0.9463*** -0.8589**
(0.2662) (0.2741)
SLTA -0.1459 0.1392
(0.1521) (0.1899)
LNAGE 0.1240 0.1449
(0.1826) (0.1855)
Model Fit: 154.84*** 166.36***
Likelihood Ratio: 11.52***
Significance codes:    : 0:001,  : 0:01,  : 0:05, :  0:1
Lastly, in the original Zmijewski model, net income to total assets (NITA)
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and total liabilities to total assets (TLTA) are statistically significant, whereas
the natural logarithm of firm age (LNAGE) and current assets to current lia-
bilities (CACL) have no significance. Insignificance of current assets to current
liabilities is surprising because current assets should capture the impact of in-
ventory and current liabilities should capture inventory related liabilities (e.g.,
accounts payable) for a retailer. Once again, adding inventory turnover (IT)
as an explanatory variable improves the model fit by increasing the likelihood
from 139.52 to 152.37, which is a significant increase at p  0:001. Inventory
turnover has statistical significance with the correct sign at p  0:01. After in-
ventory turnover is added to the original Zmijewski model, net income to total
assets and total liabilities to total assets remain statistically significant, and the
natural logarithm of firm age and current assets to current liabilities continue to
have no significance. Please see Table 3.7 for details.
Table 3.7: Logistic regression results with the Zmijewski model variables.
Zmijewski Model
Base Model Base Model + IT
Intercept -5.6124*** -5.0136***
(0.6466) (0.6874)
IT -0.10884**
(0.0371)
NITA -15.1629*** -15.1491***
(1.5872) (1.6461)
TLTA 1.5713** 1.9980**
(0.5657) (0.6389)
LNAGE 0.1070 0.0889
(0.1688) (0.1703)
CACL 0.0494 -0.0649
(0.1317) (0.1446)
Model Fit: 139.52*** 152.37***
Likelihood Ratio: 12.85***
Significance codes:    : 0:001,  : 0:01,  : 0:05, :  0:1
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3.6 Limitations and Future Work
The analysis we present in the previous section is the first empirical step to-
wards quantifying the impact of a retailer’s operational performance on its
bankruptcy risk. We show that adding inventory turnover as an explanatory
variable to commonly used bankruptcy prediction models (i.e., the private firm
model, the Altman model, and the Zmijewski model) improves model fit in all
three cases and that retailers with low inventory turnover have higher proba-
bility of bankruptcy. Despite this promising result, we do not perform any out
of sample forecasts due to the small sample size of our data set. Hence, we can-
not claim that the prediction accuracy of our model is superior than that of the
existing models.
Future work that will strengthen our message includes replicating our anal-
ysis on a larger data set including more bankruptcies and more industries, such
as wholesalers and manufacturers. A larger data set will allow us to perform
out of sample bankruptcy predictions and test whether IT improves prediction
accuracy of the existing models. It will also enable us to perform long range
forecasts. The prediction accuracy of an IT based model might be better than
that of the existing models because inventory turnover might be a leading in-
dicator for various organizational inefficiencies within the firm. Lastly, alterna-
tive explanatory variables can be used to find the best proxy for a firm’s op-
erational efficiency. Other operational metrics, such as fixed asset utilization,
might have more explanatory power in industries that require higher fixed in-
vestments (e.g., production plants) than retailers.
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